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AUSTRIA’S PRE-WAR
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Maria L. Marcus ∗

INTRODUCTION
On May 19, 1930, a Viennese newspaper published an article under the
title, “His Magnificence The Rector: Scandal at the University of Vienna.” 1
The author analyzed and attacked the government-sponsored University’s
new regulations dividing the students into four “nations”—German, nonGerman (e.g., Jewish), mixed, or “other.” These regulations had been
presented by the Rector as vehicles for voluntary association of students
with common ethnic roots. The article noted, however, that under the new
system, individuals were precluded from deciding themselves to which
nation they belonged. A student would be designated as non-German even
if he was a German-speaking Austrian citizen descended from generations
of citizens, unless he could prove that his parents and his grandparents had
been baptized. 2
∗ Joseph M. McLaughlin Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. B.A.
Oberlin College, 1954; J.D. Yale Law School, 1957. The author is the daughter of Austrian
Constitutional Court Justice Arthur Lenhoff, to whom this Article is dedicated, and was
Associate Counsel at the NAACP National Office from 1961-1967. I wish to thank Martin
Flaherty, Abner Greene, Thomas Lee, Eduardo Penalver, Russell Robinson, Terry Smith,
and Lloyd L. Weinreb, as well as participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty
Workshop, for valuable suggestions on a prior draft of this Article. Dr. Edith Palmer,
Foreign Law Specialist, Library of Congress, gave expert assistance. Norman Marcus
supplied inspiration and support. I am grateful for the dedicated research aid of Fordham
law students Shimon Berger and Simon Singer. Fordham Law School provided a generous
research grant.
1. Seine Magnifizenz der Rektor: Der Weiner Universitaets Skandal [His Magnificence
the Rector: The Vienna University Scandal], WIENER SONN-UND MONTAGS ZEITUNG, May
19, 1930, at 4 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author). Ernst
Klebinder, Editor-in-Chief, identified himself as the author of the article and took
responsibility for its content. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
2. See BRUCE F. PAULEY, FROM PREJUDICE TO PERSECUTION: A HISTORY OF AUSTRIAN
ANTI-SEMITISM 125 (1992); Protokoll über die öffentliche-mündliche Verhandlung des
VfGH am 18.6.1931 [Public Hearing in Constitutional Court on June 18, 1931], AVAVfGH, V 2/31-10 at 4 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author)
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The newspaper’s editor was criminally prosecuted for this publication on
the grounds that he had failed to exercise “press prudence,” and had
defamed the Academic Senate and the Rector of the University of Vienna
by accusing them of promulgating unlawful measures. 3 His defense was
that the article had accurately characterized the university regulations as
unconstitutional, and that academic officials had no authority to create such
student groups. This legal analysis was grounded on the conclusions of an
eminent authority, Dr. Joseph Hupka, a former Dean of Vienna Law
School. 4 The trial court, presided over by the Justice for Press Affairs,
admitted all the defendant’s evidence and granted his application to petition
the Constitutional Court—Austria’s highest tribunal on fundamental
constitutional matters—for rescission of the regulations in their entirety. 5
In the hearing before the Constitutional Court, counsel for the defendant
editor argued that equality of all citizens before the law prohibited
differentiating individuals on the basis of ethnic group, language, or
religion. In a chillingly prophetic comment, he suggested that if a
government-operated university could lawfully mandate such student
separation, then it would be possible for the government to do so in all
situations, compelling residence in different parts of town and employment
only by a person of the same religion. 6 The response by the Rector was
that there was no constitutional defect in the University’s regulations
because the student groups all had identical rights.7 Less than twenty-five
years later in the United States, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
separate-but-equal claims in Brown v. Board of Education.8
Constitutional generalities such as equal protection, freedom of
association, and rights of citizenship must be unpacked by focusing on their
less appealing implications. Consider whether equal protection is satisfied
if groups have equal rights but unequal power; whether freedom of
association necessarily and invariably encompasses the freedom to exclude;
[hereinafter Hearing].
3. Sammlung
der
Erkenntnisse
und
Wichtigsten
Beschlüsse
des
Verfassungsgerichtshofes [Decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court], VfSlg 1397/1931,
AVA-VfGH, V 2/31-12 at 298 (June 20, 1931) (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003)
(translation on file with author) [hereinafter Decision]. The decision was announced on
June 23, 1931.
4. Aus dem Gerichtssalle [From the Courtroom], NEUE FREIE PRESSE, (Vienna), June
20, 1930, at 3. (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author). See
infra note 249 for a description of Dr. Hupka’s prior stance in the public press.
5. Decision, supra note 3, at 298.
6. Hearing, supra note 2, at 7.
7. Id. at 5.
8. See generally 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (disavowing the prior decision in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896)).
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and whether the prerogatives of generations of citizenship are inadequate to
trump competing claims.
This Article analyzes these questions in two contexts: the little-known
legal developments in pre-Hitler Austria that staved off the attempt to
segregate University students, and the still-controversial formulation in
Brown that sought to end racial segregation of students in America. The
United States Supreme Court in the 1950’s, like the Austrian Constitutional
Court, was asked to interpret a constitutional equality principle that
embodied the ideals of a democracy but was in conflict with a violent and
historically-entrenched reality.
Part I will discuss the actual deliberations of the Austrian Constitutional
Court Justices in this case and explore the shaping of their decision, a
decision reflecting an uneasy synthesis of opposing views. The Justices
rejected the Rector’s jurisdictional objections, and instead undertook the
responsibility of striking down the Student Orders on the basis of statutory
violations. Yet the opinion also contained language that might guide the
Academic Senate in future grouping of students by “nationality” if such
division conformed to constitutional principles.
The Constitutional Court was denounced in the pan-German press as “an
enemy of the German people in terms of blood and political policy,”9 and
members of the German Student Body protested the decision by engaging
in a campaign of brutal assaults against other students. 10 The Rector
protected these assailants from arrest by the police.11 The next few years
produced not only a dramatic attempt to achieve segregation of University
students through federal legislation, but also a new Constitution that
substantially diminished the Court’s powers and the rights of Austrian
citizens to receive equal treatment. Nonetheless, the judiciary’s rejection
of Austria’s first effort to separate citizens on the basis of religion and
ethnicity was effective until the Anschluss of Germany and Austria seven
years later.
Part II of the Article will consider the relevance of the Constitutional
Court’s ruling to Brown and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 12 cases
and underlying facts with curious parallels to the Austrian situation. The

9. Der Verfassungsgerichtshof bricht deutsches Recht! [The Constitutional Court
Breaks German Law!], DEUTSCHOESTERREICHISCHE TAGES-ZEITUNG (Vienna), June 24,
1931, at 1 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author).
10. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 126.
11. See id.
12. 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that assignment of an African-America student to
separate facilities within the University of Oklahoma constituted a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause).
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segregationist regimes in both countries invoked similar mystiques and
developed similar prohibitions. There were also substantial differences: in
Austria, the universities were receding from uneasy integration to (literal)
dis-integration. In America, the trajectory was reversed.
Part III, however, suggests that Brown’s prohibition against segregation
in public universities has left unanswered questions about the conflict
between First and Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Associational
freedoms may be pitted against anti-discrimination policies and the
compelling academic interest in a diverse student body recognized in the
Supreme Court’s Grutter v. Bollinger opinion. 13 Exploring concepts of
association, equality, and diversity in the violent Austrian society of the
1930’s can illuminate the present-day constitutional conflicts facing
America’s universities and courts.
I.
In my discussion of mandatory invidious separation of university
students in Austria and in America, I interpret the term “racism” as
implicating more than one group’s consuming dislike of another. Under
Professor George Fredrickson’s brief and useful definition, “racism exists
when one ethnic group or historical collectivity dominates, excludes, or
seeks to eliminate another on the basis of differences that it believes are
hereditary and unalterable.” 14
* * * *
The University of Vienna’s regulations—the Nazi Student Orders, as
they came to be called—were the culmination of decades of strife that had
complex political, religious, and economic elements. The Austrian
Habsburg monarchy’s multi-national empire had collapsed by the end of
1918, and post-war Austria was merely the bodyless head that remained
after the break-up. 15 University students had bleak employment prospects
in the diminished territory of the Austrian republic, with its enormous
surplus of civil servants and soldiers. The rather high percentage of Jewish
students, some from the former Austro-Hungarian eastern provinces,
produced competition for jobs that helped to fuel an academic anti-

13. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
14. GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 170 (2002). In the Nazi
framework of belief, Jews were a “race” rather than adherents of a religion, tainted by
nature and “blood.” See infra Parts I.H.2 and II.A.1.
15. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 78-79.
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Semitism exceeding that of Germany. 16 Professor Bruce F. Pauley has
observed that this anti-Semitism was permitted by sympathetic university
administrators and sheltered by a concept of academic autonomy,
originating in the Middle Ages, which permitted universities to police (or
decline to police) themselves. 17
As will be shown below, Nazi power both inside and outside the
universities increased in the 1930’s, though not without conflict. Student
groups fought for political dominance; the Justices of the Constitutional
Court struggled for unanimity in disposing of the Nazi Student Orders; top
federal officials launched a fresh legislative segregation package; and a
new Constitution established an authoritarian corporate state that was later
absorbed into a Third Reich in which one could be “German” but no longer
Austrian and certainly not Jewish.

A.

The Political Setting of the Constitutional Court’s Decision:
Student Polarization and Nazi Violence

The Socialist administration of “Red Vienna” gave little thought to the
economic insecurity of University students, perhaps convinced that most of
them were anti-Semites and anti-communists. 18 Flowing into this vacuum,
the German Student Body set up a foreign monetary exchange and
provided cheaper meals for poor students. 19 Its members extolled manhood
and honor in the field of battle, a battle against the myriad enemies they
believed were encircling them. Recurring attacks against democrats,
Socialists, pacifists, and especially Jews, were carried out by the German
Student Body without interference by University officials during the 1920’s
and early 1930’s. 20
To cite only a few examples, Nazi students from the Technical College
invaded the lecture hall of a famous scholar at the Anatomy Institute in
1923, ordering that all Jews vacate the room. 21 The following day, Nazis
stormed into the classroom of a professor at the College of International
Trade and demanded, in the name of the German Student Body, the
removal of all Jewish students. Those who did not leave within three
minutes were beaten with sticks and rubber clubs, and thrown from the top
16. Id. at 89.
17. Id.
18. John Haag, Blood On The Ringstrasse: Vienna’s Students, 1918-33, in WEINER
LIBRARY BULLETIN 29, 33 (1976).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 31; see also infra Part I.E.1.
21. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 89, 97.
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of the ramp in front of the main University building. 22 Police officers
posted nearby did not intervene because of “academic freedom”—not the
students’ freedom to study and do research, but the institution’s protection
from outside intervention.23 This violence was so extreme that the
Reichspost, the official daily newspaper of the Christian Social Party,
called the riot “not only a great wrong, but also a great stupidity” because it
would provide a strong argument for enemies of Christian German culture
who wished to undermine the University’s authority to govern itself.24
During 1927 celebrations of the founding of the Republic, Nazi students
attacked the Socialist Student Association, singing a triumphant party song
as injured people were carried away. 25 In a series of confrontations, they
also destroyed posters of Jewish organizations, invaded lectures of Jewish
professors, captured security officials for hours at a time, and disrupted the
office of the university’s chancellor.26
In the 1930’s large rings of Nazi students, armed with brass knuckles
and rubber truncheons, would gang up on individuals whose religion or
opinions were disfavored. 27 This brutality was also mirrored outside the
University, where Austrian Nazis repeatedly attacked Jewish businessmen
and their families, and at times assaulted pedestrians in the Viennese streets
who “looked Jewish.” 28 Such mass aggressions also occurred with the rise
of segregation in the American South, where mobs assaulted, robbed and
murdered African-Americans. 29
B.

The Constitutional Court’s Judgment

Under the Austrian system, no ordinary court had the power to “examine
into the validity of laws duly proclaimed.” 30 The Constitutional Court had
the sole authority to exercise this critical function.31 The federal President
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 98.
25. Id. at 122.
26. Id. at 124.
27. Stenographisches Protokoll, 77, Sitzung des Nationalrates der Republik Oesterreich
IV. Gesetzgebungsperiode Freitag. 29. April 1932 [Stenographic Minutes, 77th Session of
the National Council of the Republic of Austria, Legislative Session, Friday, April 29,
1932], at 2084-85 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author)
[hereinafter Parliamentary Debate]; see infra Part I.F.2.
28. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 196. The 1930 Nazi electoral victories in Germany
encouraged such assailants. Id.
29. See infra Part II.A.3.
30. AUS. CONST. art. 89(1) (1929).
31. HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 126 (2d ed. 2000); J.A.C.
Grant, Judicial Review of Legislation Under the Austrian Constitution of 1920, 28 AM. POL.
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appointed all the Justices from legally designated slates. 32 The Court’s
President, Vice President and six of the Associate Justices were chosen
from a list prepared by the federal ministry. Six additional Associate
Justices were selected from lists prepared by the houses of Parliament. 33
These Justices received requests from other courts and administrative
bodies to resolve constitutional and legal challenges or jurisdictional
disputes. 34 Although the newspaper editor who was prosecuted for his
criticism of the Nazi Student Orders could not directly bring an action in
the Constitutional Court, the trial court could hear his claims and then
petition the High Court for disposition of them.
1.

The University’s Orders and Justifications

After affirming its jurisdiction and announcing its holding that the
Student Orders were rescinded as contrary to law, 35 the Constitutional
Court sets out the salient facts in a colorless manner that makes no mention
of the violent context in which the Orders were issued.
The University of Vienna’s Rector had proclaimed that students of
“German ethnic origin” were organized at German universities into groups
extending beyond national borders. The Academic Senate therefore
established the German Student Body at Vienna University as the
representative of all students of German ethnic origin, and permitted those
of other ethnic origins and native languages to affiliate with other Student
Nations “having the same rights and obligations.” 36 Although each Nation
could elect representatives, the Academic Senate had the authority to
revoke recognition of anyone who injured interests that “affect the German
character of the university.” 37
A student’s declaration of ethnic origin and native language made in an
official personal identification document was the basis for assignment to a

SCI. REV. 670, 671 (1934).
32. HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 139. For an overview of the development of
Constitutional Courts in Europe and Central and Latin America, see id. at 137-138.
One should note in particular that in times of radical political change from a
totalitarian to a democratic system, the regular judiciary is invariably tainted but
cannot be replaced quickly, whereas a specialized constitutional court may be
staffed with competent and reputable jurists. If sufficiently broad access is
provided . . . , this court may swiftly impose constitutionality from above.
Id. at 138.
33. Id. at 139; Grant, supra note 31, at 671 n.7.
34. See Grant, supra note 31, at 671-72.
35. Decision, supra note 3, at 296.
36. Id. at 297.
37. Id.
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Nation. 38 Such a student’s self-description was not dispositive, however,
because representatives of a Student Nation could file objections to any
membership claim. Objections would be finally determined by an
arbitration panel comprised of three people appointed from the teaching
staff by the Academic Senate, one representative of the objecting Nation,
and possibly one representative of another Nation.39
The opinion then explains how the case reached the High Court. Ernst
Klebinder, the editor of a Viennese newspaper, was prosecuted for failing
to exercise press prudence and insulting the Rector and the Academic
Senate by accusing them of passing unconstitutional measures. 40 At a
public trial on June 20, 1930 in the District Criminal Court in Vienna, the
accused “produced evidence of the accuracy of all the points made in the
article.” 41 He urged that the Regulations (the Rector’s term for the Student
Orders) violated the Constitution, since both Austrian Jewish citizens and
other citizens among the students were discriminated against in favor of the
German Student Body. After receiving these pleadings, the Criminal Court
proceeded to petition the Constitutional Court for rescission of the
Regulations on the grounds that 1) the Academic Senate had no authority to
issue them under relevant statutes and disciplinary provisions and 2) the
Regulations violated constitutional guarantees of equal rights because they
divided students on the basis of “the principle of ethnic origin rather than
the principle of citizenship.” 42
At a subsequent hearing before the Constitutional Court, the
Academic Senate argued on the procedural front that the Regulations were
only by-laws of a student-run body having the right of selfadministration. 43 As to the equal citizenship claims, the Senate offered the
justification that the Regulations put all the Nations on the same footing.
“[A]t most it can be claimed that for many of the Student Nations this
right . . . has less value than it has for others” but that it would not violate
the principle of equality. 44
2.

Gist of the Court’s Disposition of the Issues

After this summary of the prior proceedings, the Constitutional Court
addressed the key questions. Did the Academic Senate have the authority
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 298.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 301.
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to establish segregated student groups? Would compulsory “ethnic origin”
divisions among citizens violate the Constitution?
The first question was definitively answered. The Constitutional Court
found that the Student Orders could not be issued by a non-legislative
institution like the Academic Senate.45 The “Nations” favored by the
University were in fact associations, and were therefore strictly controlled
by statute. The Associations Law of 1867 governed the genesis and
purposes of all such bodies. 46
This potential for full supervision over citizen organizations was a
particular feature of Austrian law stemming from the reign of Emperor
Franz Joseph, a feature which will be more closely examined in Part III
below. 47 It enabled the Court to disband the German Student Body, with
all the Justices affirming that result.
By contrast, the constitutional issues were not cohesively resolved. The
opinion indicated that dividing students by “nationality” could be
permissible if these groups were given the same rights, and if the
classification accorded with constitutional principles. 48 No finding was
made as to whether the existing groups did in fact have the same rights, nor
was there any indication of how “accord” with constitutional principles
would be demonstrated, or indeed which principles were being referenced.
At a later point, the opinion reached the critical question of whether the
Student Nations were in fact voluntary in nature; the Academic Senate had
repeatedly declared that the Orders only created a framework for student
preferences. The Justices concluded that the regulations apparently
established compulsory organizations and then curtly stated that it was
unnecessary to expand on the reasons why such entities could not be
established by mere Order. None of the statutes governing associations

45. Id. at 306.
46. Id. at 305.
47. See also infra Part I.G.2.b, describing the registration procedures under the statute.
Austria was still a monarchy until a little over a decade before the Constitutional Court’s
historic decision, and the Associations Law originated as a liberalizing measure under the
Emperor.
48. Decision, supra note 3, at 303-04. The Court did not explain whether this dictum
referred solely to the constitutionality of creating voluntary divisions. The Justices noted,
however, that “as the Academic Senate emphasizes, the contested Student Regulations are
aimed at giving students of a given ethnic origin the framework of an Order within which
they can voluntarily come together.” Id. at 304-05. In the same paragraph, the opinion
identifies the purpose of the Regulations: “Thus the Student Regulations are intended to be
general regulations, on the basis of which the University students, depending on their origin
and native language, voluntarily form permanent organized connections for the pursuit of
specific common goals.” Id.
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permitted this arrangement. 49 The door was now open for the Court to
apply the equality principle of the Austrian Constitution and to proclaim
that although voluntary student groupings would be permissible,
compulsory divisions would be prohibited. Instead, the opinion at this
point remained equivocal.50
Yet the Justices held back from explicit endorsement of mandatory
divisions, whether generated by academic fiat or statute. Indeed, this
failure to legitimate compulsion was duly noted by federal officials who
crafted a legislative segregation package in the following year, an effort
that will be discussed below at Part I.E. In presenting this package to
Parliament, the Minister of Education insisted that the student divisions
created were wholly voluntary. 51
Also of significance was the Court’s refusal to endorse “ethnic origin” as
a basis for the student groupings that received conditional approval (if they
all have the same rights, if they conform to the Constitution, if they accord
with statutory provisions). The ethnic origin standard would inter alia
have forced a student with a Jewish parent (or grandparent) into a Jewish
group he would not elect. If he regarded himself as an entirely secular
Austrian, or conversely as a devout Lutheran, it would make no difference
to this unwanted group assignment.
Penetration of the Court’s shifting emphases and curious omissions
requires more extensive analysis. The judges’ strategy at this perilous
historic moment can be illuminated by discussion of their actual
deliberations, which now follows. Listen to the Justices’ colloquy on each
of these constitutional issues, as they made concessions, created majorities,
and then voted. Their shifting dialogue reflected their awareness that
future legislative action or constitutional amendment might alter the terrain
by validating student separation.
C. The Justices’ Internal Debate
The Austrian Constitution of 1929 was an elegant and complete
statement of the civil and political rights of citizens. It built on the work of
49. Id. at 306.
50. Id. After listing statutes governing associations in general, the Court states:
“Regulations covering the students themselves and dividing them into specific groups could
be created only by law.” Id. This sentence might be interpreted as a mere summary of the
statutes that have just been cited, which form a barrier against University-created Orders.
On the other hand, placement of the sentence directly after identification of the Student
Nations as apparently compulsory might be read as permitting even compulsory associations
if they were effectuated “by law.” No existing constitutional obstacles to such a plan are
discussed.
51. See infra Part I.F.2.
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Dr. Hans Kelsen, and incorporated portions of the 1919 Treaty of SaintGermain concerning protection of minorities.52 All Austrian nationals
were equal before the law, enjoying the same rights without distinction as
to language, religion, or race. The Constitution guaranteed that differences
in religion “shall not prejudice any Austrian national in the exercise of civil
rights,” and that Austrians who belonged to racial, religious, or other
minorities “shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as
the other Austrian nationals.” 53 These guarantees were cited by the District
Criminal Court in its petition to the Constitutional Court for rescission of
the challenged University regulations.
In fashioning the decision that struck down the Nazi Student Orders, the
Constitutional Court judges were acutely aware of the political
ramifications of their choices. They disagreed on the core issues, and on
how to explain these issues to a polarized and potentially violent audience.
Their backroom colloquy and concerns paralleled internal discussions
among the United States Supreme Court Justices in Brown about the effect
that a desegregation decision would have on Southern sensibilities and
tempers. 54
The Austrian bench was large, with fourteen members. 55 Because
tradition precluded dissenting and concurring opinions, they operated under
the internal discipline of debating and voting on each approach until the
final one was reluctantly embraced. 56 Justices Ludwig Adamovich,
Hermann Eckel, Ernst Durig, Georg Froehlich, and Arthur Lenhoff took the
lead in suggesting strategies and specific wording. 57

52. See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 4-5 for a summary of the collapse of the
Austro-Hungarian monarchy after Austria’s defeat in World War I and the establishment of
an Austrian republic pursuant to terms of the peace treaty of Saint-Germain; and at 137 for a
summary of the role of Hans Kelsen as the “father” of the Constitution of 1920. For details
of the developments of the Austrian republic in the years following 1918, see MALBONE W.
GRAHAM, JR., NEW GOVERNMENTS OF CENTRAL EUROPE 132, 137, passim (1924) (“Never
was a revolution carried out more peacefully and with more devout intentions.”).
53. See Treaty of St.-Germain, arts. 66 and 67, Part III ICL Document Status, Sept. 10
,1919. In 1934, a new Austrian Constitution launched by the administration of Chancellor
Engelbert Dollfuss gave this equality provision another twist that made it malleable to
executive power. See infra Part I.G.2.a.
54. See infra Part II.B.1.b.
55. HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 139.
56. Id. at 149. The United States Supreme Court Justices deciding Brown also struggled
to produce a unanimous opinion, which was facilitated by a change in the Court’s
composition. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 584-85, 663-65, 683-84, 697-99 (1975).
57. The backgrounds and known political affiliations of these Justices provide a very
limited basis for predicting their viewpoints and votes. Dr. Adamovich, a University
professor in Graz, was listed in treatises on the Court as neutral (which meant that he was
appointed by the federal administration without prior nomination by a Parliamentary party);
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Nullification on Statutory Grounds: The Associations Law

Minutes taken during the Justices’ deliberations show that their dialogue
was courteous and free-flowing, although there was initial disagreement
and a split vote on every issue. The statutory challenge to the Orders was
that any permanent organization must emanate from and be governed by
the Austrian Associations Law. Formation of the student groups by the
Academic Senate violated this principle, and therefore a formal basis
existed for prohibiting them.
Disagreement centered on two points: whether the “Nations” were
associations at all, and whether the students themselves retained a right to
associate for common purposes regardless of any governing statute. One
Justice opined that the “Nations” were only auxiliaries to University
authorities in administering “discipline.” 58 Another countered that the
Nations did have significant characteristics of associations because they
could affiliate with external student organizations and collect dues.59
Although Justice Adamovich was not part of the liberal wing, he
nonetheless emphasized that “the entire framework provided by the Student
Regulations could not be reconciled with the Associations Law.”60 Every
permanent voluntary organization committed to a continuing purpose was
an association. Even if the Nations were regarded as a sui generis type of
organization, a special law would be required.
Students could not themselves form a valid corporate body but they
could apply for permission directly under the Associations Law and
comply with its requirements, Justice Adamovich suggested. Justice
Dr. Durig, neutral, was President of the Constitutional Court; Dr. Eckel was apparently
affiliated with the Greater Germany Party; Dr. Froehlich, neutral, was Vice President of the
Court and Reporting Justice on the Student Orders decision (assigned to present a draft
opinion at the deliberations); Dr. Lenhoff, a Professor at Vienna Law School, was not a
member of a political party but was nominated by the Social Democrats. Looking at the
whole group of fourteen, six were categorized as neutral, one as a Social Democrat, two as
neutral but leaning towards or nominated by Social Democrats, one as “Grdt,” and four as
Christian Social. The Justices could continue to teach while serving on the Court. Thomas
Zavadil, Die Ausschaltung des Verfassungsgerichtshof 1933, Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung
des Magistergrades der Philosophie and der Geisteswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der
Universitaet Wien [The Exclusion of the Constitutional Court, 1933 (unpublished M.A. of
Philosophy thesis, University of Vienna)] 42-43, 52, 262-266 (1997) (on file with the
School of Liberal Arts of the University of Vienna) (Translation Aces trans., 2003)
(translation on file with author).
58. Protokoll uber Beratung und Abstimmung des VfGH vom 19/20.6.1931 [Minutes of
the Deliberations and Voting of the Constitutional Court, June 19-20 1931] AVA-VfGH, V
2/31-11 at 7-8 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author)
[hereinafter Deliberations].
59. Id. at 8-9.
60. Id. at 8.
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Lenhoff insisted that “fundamental rights included the right to proclaim
oneself a member of a specific Nation.” But the system inaugurated by the
Academic Senate did not support such student rights; indeed, it suppressed
them. Membership must be based on free choice, he explained, never on
compulsion. Here, a student could be assigned to a Nation “without regard
to whether he did or did not want to belong to it.” 61
The primacy of the Associations Law prevailed. A crucial vote was
taken and the eight-person majority agreed, with five dissents, that the Nazi
Student Orders must be abrogated. 62 The Justices’ logically-structured
deliberations on the statutory question led to crisp explanations in the
decision set out above. In striking contrast, their clashing agendas on the
constitutional challenge precluded the development of a coherent position,
even on the question of whether to take at face value the Rector’s assertion
that the Orders were merely an attempt to facilitate student preferences.
2. The Constitutional Debates
The debate is notable for what it did not discuss. What would the
Academic Senate achieve by putting a government stamp on student
divisions based on ethnic origin? The German Student Body was already
occupying a privileged position at the University, assisting the
administration with “discipline,” influencing policy, affiliating with similar
bodies outside of Austria, sometimes given faculty rooms for its political
meetings while such spaces were off limits to other student groups,
permitted with impunity to drive Jewish students out of classrooms. 63 Why
was a new phase needed? The Government-sponsored University’s
subordination of religious and other minorities by packing them into
Nations of “less value” (to use the Academic Senate’s own words) had both
a practical and a prophetic significance. In practical terms, the minority
would be precluded from a prime benefit of equal treatment by
government: sharing in the position of the strong. In prophetic terms, the
stigma that the German Student Body had attempted to impose by
vituperation and violence on religious and other minorities would now
61. Id. at 12. Based on the information a student was obliged to provide to the
University in data form with questions about ethnic origin, he would then be required to
belong to an assigned nation. Id.
62. Id. at 9; see also Brigitte Fenz, Zur Ideologie Der “Volksbürgerschaft.” Die
Studentenordnung der Universitaet Wien vom 8.April 1930 vor dem Verfassungsgerichtshof
[The Ideology Of “Ethnic Citizenship,” the University of Vienna’s Student Regulations of
April 8, 1930 before the Constitutional Court], ZEIT GESCHICHTE, Jan., 1978, at 134
(Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with author) [hereinafter Fenz I].
63. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 93, 118; see also Hearing, supra note 2, at 3; CHARLES
A. GULICK, AUSTRIA FROM HABSBURG TO HITLER 639-41 (1948).
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achieve official University approval and acquire a forward motion.
As counsel for the beleaguered editor who challenged the Student Orders
had emphasized, judicial permission to segregate the University’s student
body would be the first step towards undermining the edifice of equality
and imposing segregation in employment, residence, and other areas of
life. 64 This prediction had been presented to the Court, but no reference
was made to it in the polarized Justices’ dialogue. During the same era in
the American South, the pervasive intrusion of racism into every aspect of
political and economic life had already been established. 65
The issues that emerged in Austria were these: should the Court approve
the concept of separate but equal student bodies? If so, what would a valid
basis for this separation be? If the equality principle were no barrier to
division predicated on “common points of view,” could there be other
constitutional obstacles to such a division? Should “ethnic origin” be used
as a permissible example of a common point of view?
Much of the subsequent disagreement centering around the validity of a
separate-but-equal system does not identify that system as a compulsory
one. A motion that appeared to be a compromise was made by Justice
Eckel. The Court could note that division by Nation would not violate the
Constitution if these Nations were accorded the same duties and rights, but
the opinion should state that no finding had been made on whether in fact
this equal allotment had occurred because the Student Orders had already
been rescinded on other grounds. 66 In his draft, Justice Eckel did not
contradict the Rector’s assertion that the regulations merely established
voluntary groups.
This approach, providing future encouragement to the Academic Senate
without reaching a holding, sparked vigorous debate. Justice Adamovich
argued in support that the Treaty of Saint-Germain as incorporated into the
Constitution had favored permitting the grouping of students into nations.67
He may have intended a reference to Article 67, Minority Protection, which
provided that Austrian nationals belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic
minorities have the right to establish their own schools and religious
institutions as a matter of voluntary choice. Yet, Adamovich did not
mention the Treaty’s statement that such Austrians are entitled to “the same
treatment . . .in law and in fact as other Austrian nationals,” 68 a
constitutional provision that remained as a formidable barrier against any
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Hearing, supra note 2, at 7.
See infra Part II.A.3.
Deliberations, supra note 58, at 13.
Id. at 14.
See supra, note 53; Part I.C.
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compulsory division.
Another Justice voiced strong objections to Justice Eckel’s motion on
the grounds that majority/minority separation on any basis was prohibited.
Under the Constitution of the Universities, students may only be classified
according to which school they attend, and whether or not they are regular
students.
The Academic Senate could not construct a different,
fragmenting set of divisions. 69
Yes, it could, Justice Adamovich insisted. And let’s insert this sentence
into our decision: “Contrary to the legal opinion expressed in the petition of
District Criminal Court I in Vienna, the Constitutional Court finds that
classification of students according to specified common points of view”
does not violate the principle of equality or any other constitutional
provision if these groups have the same rights.70 The District Criminal
Court’s opinion as quoted by the High Court would have prohibited inter
alia the voluntary divisions that the Academic Senate and the Rector had
identified. Adamovich did not unpack the question of whether his proposal
would merely endorse the constitutionality of the groupings as
characterized by the Rector.
Justice Lenhoff, however, opened this point for discussion by approving
any divisions arrived at by choice, but stating that “compulsory inclusion”
would violate the Constitution and therefore could only be created “by
law.” 71 The use of the word “law” may not have been merely a reference
to a statute, because the existing Constitution would continue to trump such
a lesser provision. Court President Durig and Vice President Froehlich also
noted that establishment of compulsory organizations would require further
law. 72
Another vital question remained to be determined. If divisions
(voluntary or involuntary) could be predicated on a student’s background
rather than on his regular enrollment, which factors in his background
should count? Justice Adamovich’s draft had expanded on Eckel’s
proposal by suggesting that the Court should legitimate classification on
the basis of “ethnic origin,” a principle that would have been new in
Austrian law. 73
Justice Lenhoff emphasized that the Court had not yet decided the issue
of whether division on ethnic grounds comported with the equality
principle, and urged that the phrase “ethnic origin” was not only foreign to
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Deliberations, supra note 58, at 13.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 12, 14.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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the Constitution, but so vague that it could not pass constitutional muster.74
He added as a compromise that if he were outvoted on this point, the draft
should at least contain the phrase “if . . .the division into these groups
accords with constitutional principles.” 75
The Adamovich draft, even with the supplement suggested by Lenhoff,
was opposed by another Justice on the grounds that the public would ignore
any limiting clauses and would simply assume that the Court had approved
the concept of “ethnic origin” grouping that the German Student Body of
the University and the Academic Senate had intended.76
These deliberations revealed some factors similar to those considered by
the American judges in Brown: consciousness of external pressures, as well
as conflict between the desire to reject segregation and the desire to
propitiate its proponents.77 The Austrian Justices acknowledged two
outside forces in their colloquy: the University’s hope for validation of the
Orders or at least guidance, and the German Student Body’s intense
investment in the ethnic-origin power of exclusion.
A series of votes concluded the debates. Without directly addressing the
validity of compulsory division, a majority endorsed the principle that
splitting the student body could comply with the Constitution if each group
had the same rights and other legal requirements were met. 78 Next, the
question of whether division “according to specified common points of
view” should be approved was answered in the affirmative by a vote of 12
to 1. 79 The phrase “if . . .[this] classification . . .accords with constitutional
principles” remained in the draft, without further explanation.
On the critical issue of whether ethnic origin should be used as an
acceptable example of this “common point of view,” the vote changed.
President Durig took the lead in proposing that references to ethnic origin,
the term favored by the German Student Body, must be dropped.80 Instead,

74. Id. at 14, 16-17.
75. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 18.
77. In the United States, however, the external influence pushed the Court towards
abandoning rather than preserving segregation. See infra Part II.B.1.b for discussion of the
pressure exerted by the executive branch’s integration initiatives and determination to avoid
damaging foreign relations, and the Court’s countervailing concern about soothing Southern
sensibilities by establishing gradual desegregation timetables.
78. Deliberations, supra note 58, at 16, 18.
79. Id. at 19.
80. Id.; cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s rejection of the assumption that members of the same ethnic group have a common
point of view and concluding that African-American students would have varying rather
than monolithic opinions).
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by a vote of 10 to 3, the word “nationality” was substituted.81 It is
significant that this term could fit an Austrian citizen who happened to be
Jewish in a way that “ethnic origin” might not. For example, the SaintGermain Treaty stated that Austrian nationals belonging to religious or
racial minorities must receive the same treatment “as the other Austrian
nationals.”
3.

Unanimity Without Agreement

If the Constitutional Court’s decision were evaluated only as a logical
exercise separated from political exigencies, it would remain problematic.
When viewed as a series of concessions made by opposing jurists,
however, its raison d’etre begins to emerge. Trapped in the tradition of
unanimity, a judge who would write a rigorous opinion of his own is
immersed in a group dynamic that he cannot control. In this intense
process, which lasted for two days, the Justices finally produced a
“unanimous” document that frustrated the Academic Senate’s attempt to
segregate the University of Vienna’s students.
The prosecution against the newspaper editor which had generated the
Constitutional Court’s historic decision was discontinued. After the
withdrawal of the libel charges against him, editor Ernst Klebinder stated:
“I did not intend to insult anyone or attack anyone in his person or honor.
My concern was merely to protect Austria’s highest educational institution
from the shame of an order that made a mockery of morality, reason, and
the constitution.” 82
D.

The Constitutional Court’s Institutional Constraints and
Doctrines

The Austrian Constitutional Court appeared in some respects to have
more complete control over constitutional controversies than the United
States Supreme Court. In contrast to America’s judicial system, where the
lower federal courts dispose of the bulk of constitutional claims, Austria’s
High Court was the sole body authorized to determine the constitutionality
of laws. 83 This centralized power was solidified in the Constitution of
81. Deliberations, supra note 58, at 19. A 1922 decision of an Austrian administrative
court had made clear that “nationality” was distinct from a biological or cultural community.
PAULEY, supra note 2, at 88.
82. See Fenz I, supra note 62, at 141.
83. See Hans Kelsen, Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the
Austrian and the American Constitution, 4 J. POL. 183, 185-86 (1942). The District
Criminal Court, where the case commenced, could rule on questions such as whether the
honor of the Rector had been insulted and whether the editor had failed to exercise press
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1920, replacing a prior system that permitted other tribunals to issue
inconsistent rulings that had no stare decisis effect. 84
As will be seen below, however, the Constitutional Court’s
institutional authority was far more constricted than that of its American
counterpart. The Austrian Court was vulnerable to the legislature,
restrained by its own civil code traditions, and—in the 1930’s—facing
opposition from pervasive and violent pro-separation groups.
1.

Finality of Rulings

United States Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once said of the
Court: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
only because we are final.” 85 This finality stems not only from the
Justices’ top-of-the-judicial-pyramid position, but also from their
protection against legislative assault on constitutional rulings. It is the
Supreme Court’s prerogative, claimed since Marbury v. Madison,86 to “say
what the law is.” 87 The members of the Court may jettison their own prior
constitutional pronouncements, but Congress would violate separation-ofpowers principles if it trumped such pronouncements.88
The counter-majoritarian difficulty—the existence of an unelected
branch of government with this final authority to interpret and to nullify
democratic enactments—has caused some discomfort both inside and
outside the judiciary. 89 Nevertheless, a recent call for a constitutional

prudence.
84. Id.
85. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
86. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
87. Id. at 177.
88. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C.A. 2000bb); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing the Court’s own prior decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986)). The Supreme Court had previously held in Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 919 (1990) that the government need only meet
a rational relations test in prohibiting the use of peyote in religious practices. In RFRA,
Congress had acted to restore a higher tier compelling-interest test in cases where
government action would clash with the First Amendment. But the Supreme Court’s
Boerne decision reclaimed its judicial turf, declaring that Congress had the power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment but no power to determine what qualifies as a constitutional
violation. 521 U.S. at 536.
89. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Rule of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 779, 781 (1989); Bob Herbert, In America, A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A29. But cf. David Luban, Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of
Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 456 (1994) (arguing that “the undercutting democracy
objection unravels on closer inspection”). For further discussion on judicial independence,
see generally infra Part II.B.1 (discussing judicial independence).
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amendment that would allow judicial decisions to be overruled by a simple
majority in each house of Congress gained no momentum. 90 The Drafters
of the United States Constitution chose to create formidable roadblocks
against any amendments, thus enhancing the inviolability of the Justices’
prior rulings. 91
Not so in Austria. Unlike the United States Constitution, the
Constitution of Austria is easily amended. Any legislative proposal may be
raised to constitutional status merely by designating it as a “constitutional
provision” and passing it by a two-thirds majority in the Nationalrat
(National Council) of Parliament. 92 The resultant rule need not be
incorporated into the actual text of the Constitution. Therefore, in addition
to the forty or more amendments appearing in the Constitution’s text, there
are hundreds of constitutional provisions outside of the Constitution itself,
often appearing in unexpected places. 93 The Austrian justices therefore had
no assurance that an unpopular ruling would finally dispose of a
constitutional controversy.
2.

Tradition and Judicial Self-Restraint

Our federal courts were modeled on the English judiciary, inheriting a
common law tradition. In a multi-layered analysis of judicial self-restraint,
Judge Richard A. Posner notes that many of the matters that American
judges must determine are “common law issues in a functional sense: the
application of a body of judge-made law is required to decide them.”94
Rejecting as simplistic the equation of self-restraint with “goodness” and
judicial activism with “badness,” Posner suggests that a judge’s choices
must depend in part on the particular historical context of the case. If Chief
Justice Marshall had exercised judicial self-restraint in deciding Marbury v.
Madison, his choice could now be viewed as a disaster. 95 The Framers of
the United States Constitution knew that judges made law, yet they
established a federal judiciary with life-time tenure. They crafted this

90. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 117 (1996) (suggesting that
such an amendment as the “only” means to bring the federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, “back to constitutional legitimacy.”). Bork later abandoned his proposal, concluding
that this kind of amendment would be ineffective. Robert H. Bork, Reins on Judges: A
Long Tradition, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A32.
91. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72-74 (2d. ed. 1991) (discussing
the difficulties of obtaining a constitutional amendment).
92. See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 19-20.
93. Id.
94. Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 5-6
(1983).
95. Id. at 14.
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assurance of independence in the expectation that the judiciary would
vigorously protect individual rights against encroachment by the legislature
and the executive. 96 In doing so, the self-disciplined judge tries to decide a
case without bringing in personal policy preferences. 97
Posner concludes that judicial activism in its contemporary form has
departed from this self-discipline and “gone too far.” 98 He uses as an
example Chief Justice Earl Warren’s judicial philosophy as described by
Warren’s biographer, Professor G. Edward White.
Warren, who
shepherded the Justices into unanimity in Brown v. Board of Education,
conceived of craftsmanship as “knowing what results best harmonized with
the ethical imperative of the Constitution and how best to encourage other
justices to reach those results.” 99
Posner acknowledges that there are (limited) areas in the law where
judicial skill alone is insufficient to decide a case and therefore “big ideas”
must be introduced. 100 Such policy choices became arbitrary, however,
unless they are confined to values that are “widely . . . held.” 101
If we apply this Posner criterion to the Brown decision, what result?
Professor Michael Klarman has offered the view that by the 1950s,
traditional Southern segregationist attitudes were already being altered by
Cold War imperatives and regional linkages through television and
interstate travel. 102 Other historians such as Richard Kluger, however,
have suggested that desegregation became a widely held goal in part
because of the Brown opinion’s impetus. 103 This would reverse the
sequence of judicial choice and popular approval envisioned by Posner’s
96. Id. at 15-16.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id. (quoting G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 229-30 (1982) (summarizing
Chief Justice Warren’s approach to constitutional interpretation).
100. Id. at 24.
101. Id. at 24. Judge Posner is not referring here to the Brown decision in particular. As
examples of subjects on which there is no ethical consensus, Posner cites abortion, capital
punishment, and prison “amenities.” Id. at 17.
102. See infra Part II.B.2 (describing the challenges to Brown’s predicates and primacy).
103. KLUGER, supra note 56, at 709-10, stating:
Since the expedient demolition of reconstruction, white America had lost
enthusiasm for the enabling language of equalitarianism . . . . Denied high skills
or advanced learning, . . . [the African-American] remained a superfluous and
lower order of American being, excess baggage in the nation’s race to prosperity
and greatness. The law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, had pronounced it
permissible—indeed it was normal and expected—to degrade black America.
It was into this moral void that the Supreme Court under Earl Warren now stepped. Its
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, for all its economy, represented nothing short of a
reconsecration of American ideals.
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approach.
In Austria, judicial choices were constricted by tradition. The Justices
were operating under a Roman-law-based civil code, a statutory system
with little space for customary law and no recognition of judge-made law
as formal precedent for future cases and parties.104 As eminent Austrian
scholars such as Dr. Herbert Hausmaninger have observed, the Court took a
narrow view of its proper role: “[I]n the tradition of Hans Kelsen’s Vienna
School of Legal Positivism, it considered itself a ‘prisoner of the words of
the Constitution’ subject to ‘strict construction’ interpreting civil rights in a
more formal sense than most other European courts.” 105 Self-restraint was
a given. Evasion of responsibility, however, was not. It should be noted
that the Justices could have avoided dealing with any aspect of the Nazi
Student Orders case simply by adopting the Rector’s jurisdictional
objections and returning the controversy to the court below, but this course
was unacceptable. As the minutes of their deliberations revealed, some of
the Justices were prepared to issue a broad affirmation of the Constitution’s
anti-segregation equality principle.
They were unable to marshal
unanimity on this view, and release of several discordant opinions would
not only have been blocked by tradition but would also have clouded the
Court’s authority to resolve the issues. Instead, the Justices unanimously
nullified the Student Orders by turning to a statutory resolution that was
consonant with the Austrian legal system’s code-based foundation.
3.

De Facto Segregation Inside and Outside Austrian Universities

As the Justices fully understood, opposition to segregation based on
religion was not a “widely held” value. By 1931, following the huge Nazi
electoral victory in Germany the preceding year, Nazi students at Vienna
University were able to take control of the German Student Body. 106 Their
power was enhanced by affiliation with like-minded groups in Germany,
and the use of arms supplied by Hitler-based organizations. 107 Turning
their attention to the faculty, the Nazi students published lists of Jewish
professors—most of whom were internationally known scholars—for the
purpose of organizing boycotts of their classes.108 Other faculty members
who were sympathetic to these objectives worked quietly to prevent the

104. See HAUSMANINGER, supra note 31, at 22, 138, 229.
105. Id. at 147. The Court also operated under the principle of “interpretation in favor of
constitutionality.” Id. at 165.
106. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 125-27.
107. See infra Part I.F.2 (describing the battle in the Austrian Parliament).
108. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 195.
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advancement of any academics whose religion or opinions were suspect. 109
In every region, the culture outside the universities was also inhospitable
to the integration of Jews into Austrian life. We can turn to private
recreational organizations to find examples. The Deutscher Turnerbund
1919 (German Gymnasts’ League 1919), which had 115,000 members by
1932, regarded contact with Jews as contaminating. 110 The 250,000
member German-Austrian Alpine Club—hardly an intimate association—
followed an exclusionary and segregationist line.111
The spectrum among political and occupational groups included the
League of Anti-Semites, which defined a Jew as anyone with a Jewish
great-grandparent and advocated legal separation of Jews and non-Jews in
education and the administration of justice; 112 the Greater German People’s
Party, which favored Anschluss with Germany, and viewed treatment of
Jews as a separate nation as the only means of combating their immoral
“racial” characteristics; 113 peasant farmers who were historically antiSemitic only at times when their particular economic interests were at
issue; 114 and the Social Democratic Party, which favored progressive
housing and education programs and had many Jewish members. 115 The
Social Democrats criticized “Jewish capitalists” but avoided anti-Semitism
in their official party platform.
Bias also affected intellectuals, as evidenced by patterns in professions
such as law and medicine. Professional organizations were legally
permitted to discriminate in their membership because they were private.116
A union of physicians excluded Jews unless they had “honorably” become
Christians. 117 Vienna’s Chamber of Lawyers, to which all attorneys
belonged, was split in 1932 when many non-Jews formed their own League

109. Id. at 121.
110. Id. at 118-19.
111. Id. at 117-18; see also infra Part III.B (discussing efforts under American law to
address the problem of large private organizations with discriminatory membership
policies).
112. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 183-85.
113. Id. at 180-81.
114. Id. at 175. But, the Austrian Heimwehr or Home Guard, a paramilitary group, had
many peasant members from traditionally völkish and anti-Semitic areas like Carinthia and
Styria who combined religious distrust of Jews, hatred of socialism, and alienation from
metropolitan Vienna. Id. By 1934, the Heimwehr was no longer admitting Jews as
members. Id. at 176.
115. Id. at 77-78.
116. Id. at 117. Lawyers could also refuse clients on religious grounds. Physicians and
apothecaries, however, were legally bound to serve anyone who requested assistance. Id. at
119-20.
117. Id. at 120.
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of German-Aryan Lawyers of Austria. 118
E.
1.

The Aftermath of the Constitutional Court’s Decision

Attempts to Reestablish segregation by unlawful and lawful means

News of the Constitutional Court’s ruling generated an enormous
upsurge of violence. The German Student Body terrorized and beat nonmember students. 119 Signs reading “No Jews Allowed” were put on the
pillars of the University’s entrance. A hundred Nazi students, most in party
insignia, marched from the courtroom to the University and joined
hundreds of other Nazis in attacking Socialist and Jewish students with
rubber truncheons and steel clubs. 120 Campus guards did not intervene,
and University Rector Uebersberger protested when the municipal police
went up the ramp of the University building in an attempt to ward off the
assailants. 121 He also prohibited the police from entering the building. Out
of gratitude, Nazi students serenaded the Rector a few days afterwards.
Demonstrators against the decision in the University’s main lecture hall
announced:
We can no longer tolerate the presence of the people who for years have
been befouling the German Student Body and student power with venom
and rage at a university that notwithstanding all Constitutional Court
rulings is and will remain a German teaching and research institution. We
shall occupy the entrances to the university and shall not allow Jews to
enter institutions of higher learning. 122

As a result of these demonstrations, the University of Vienna was closed
for the rest of the academic year except for those who were taking final
examinations. The Academic Senate announced in November, 1931,
however, that it approved of the German Student Body’s goals and
methods.
Similar riots occurred after the Brown decision. At the University of
Alabama and the University of Mississippi, newly admitted students like
Autherine Lucy and James Meredith were threatened by mobs that
attempted to prevent them from attending classes because they were
African-Americans. 123 In Alabama, Lucy was expelled and the University

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Fenz I, supra note 62, at 140.
See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 126.
Id.
Fenz I, supra note 62, at 140.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
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of Alabama remained segregated for seven more years. In Mississippi, the
Governor announced that integration was unconstitutional, and threehundred national troops stayed at the University for another year to
maintain order and protect Meredith.
No such protection was provided to the beleaguered students at the
University of Vienna. A nationalistic Austrian newspaper proclaimed that
the Constitutional Court was an enemy of the German people. In an odd
inversion of fact, the article stated that the German-Austrians were being
used as “a kind of punching bag,” and then went on to declare: “Jews must
no longer pervert Roman law on German soil. Rather, German judges must
again pronounce German law in German countries.” The paper referred to
“four Jews” who rendered the “disgraceful ruling” and demanded
nullification of the decision. 124
The call for nullification was not ignored. Education Minister Czermak
asked the Council of Ministers for permission to prepare a bill that would
authorize separate student groupings in Austrian institutions of higher
learning. 125 Justice Adamovich, who had participated actively in the
Court’s decision, was one of the experts brought in to draft such a bill.
2.

Opposition to University Segregation

During the year that the Nazi Student Orders were in effect, voluntarily
formed cliques had been transformed into government-endorsed barriers
between students, enhancing the “privileged status” of “German Student
Nation” members. 126 Assessing the larger impact of these occurrences, a
liberal Viennese newspaper had commented:
If this were merely an academic game . . . , we could still resign ourselves
to it. When all is said and done, however, the future masters, leaders,
administrators, jurists, and industrial and business managers of Austria are
being trained at the University. They are being imbued from an early age
with the idea that membership in the Aryan race is a legally circumscribed
and privileged sphere. 127

The Constitutional Court’s nullification of this segregation was
celebrated in a Jewish weekly newspaper, Die Wahrheit, which described
the decision as particularly welcome “in this harsh and difficult time of
crisis in Austria, these difficult hours of struggle between existence and
124. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
125. See Fenz I, supra note 62, at 141.
126. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 125-26; see also GULICK, supra note 63, at 639-41.
127. Legalisierung des Arienparagraphen [Legalization of the Aryan Paragraphs],
WEINER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (Vienna) Apr. 11, 1930, at 1. (Translation Aces trans. 20012003) (translation on file with author).
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non-existence, this period so rich in disappointments.” 128 The paper
proclaimed that the ruling was “a victory for law.”
It should be noted that Jews living in Vienna in the 1930’s were a
heterogeneous group with striking differences in wealth, religious outlook,
and places of origin. 129 The majority were probably the poor, divided into
their own social hierarchy. At the bottom were beggars, shoe-shiners, and
sellers of newspapers; slightly higher in income were tailors and
peddlers. 130 Most of these were immigrants from the former eastern
provinces of the Empire, the despised “Ostjuden” that were a particular
target of pan-German propaganda. 131
In brief, among the organized factions were the Liberals, the Jewish
Nationalists, the Socialists, and the Orthodox. The assimilationist Liberals
centered their efforts on legal defense in the courts, personal meetings with
officials, and protests submitted to the government. 132 The Jewish
Nationalists were splintered into many factions but agreed that Jews should
be recognized as a separate nation, either as a minority in countries like
Austria or as a majority in their own state. 133 The Socialists concentrated
on addressing the economic and social welfare of those in need. 134 The
smallest group was the Orthodox Jews, generally immigrants from
Hungary and Galicia who wanted neither a modern secular Jewish state nor
assimilation into Austrian society. 135 Disagreements among these groups
occurred within the Jewish communal organization of Vienna, the
Israelitische Kultusgemeinde (“IKG”) Wien. 136 In the early 1930’s the
IKG was controlled by Liberals organized into the Union of Austrian Jews.
Both the Liberals and the Jewish Nationalists actively opposed the Nazi
Student Orders, but for quite different reasons. The Liberals objected
because the Orders in effect defined Jews as a race, rather than as adherents
of a religion. 137 The Jewish Nationalists rejected the Orders because the

128. Ernst Feldsberg, Der Freiheit eine Gasse [Road Clear], JÜDISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT
WAHRHEIT, June 26, 1931, at 1 (Translation Aces trans. 2001-2003) (translation on file
with author).
129. See HARRIET PASS FREIDENREICH, JEWISH POLITICS IN VIENNA 1918-1938 (1991).
130. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 216.
131. Id. at 177, 216; see also id. at 80 (“[The] persecution and banishment [of the
Ostjuden] have become a popular sport.”) (quoting a Zionist daily paper).
132. See FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 26.
133. Id. at 4-5.
134. Id. at 2.
135. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 226. The Orthodox constituted approximately 20% of
the Viennese Jewish community. Id.
136. Id. at 226.
137. See FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 185.
DIE
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division into “Nations” was compulsory, precluding individual Jews from
choosing their own nationality. 138
When the Union of Austrian Jews became aware that the Ministry of
Education was working on a legislative proposal to revive the Nations, the
Union presented a desperate plea to Dr. Karl Buresch, Austria’s
Chancellor:
We view the planned assertion of the racial-anti[-S]emitic position at
Austrian institutes of higher education as an attempt to remove the first
stone from the edifice of equal rights for all Austrian citizens, preparing
the enactment of the National Socialist program for the treatment of Jews
in the “Third Reich.” . . . We nourish the hope that Herr Bundeskanzler,
as head of the government, will subject our concerns and reservations
resting on constitutional grounds to reconsideration and do all in his
power to protect the Jewish population of Austria that had at all times
been loyally supporting the state, and whose ancestors have lived in this
country for over a thousand years, from suffering a diminution of its
rights.” 139

F.

The 1932 Legislative “End Run” Around the Constitutional
Court’s Decision
1.

The Chancellors’ strategy meeting

Because the Constitutional Court had blocked the continuation of
segregated student groups at the University, legislation was necessary to
overcome both statutory and constitutional obstacles. A remarkable
archival document shows that on November 25, 1931—months before a
proposed bill was introduced in the Nationalrat (National Council)—the
Austrian Chancellor Dr. Karl Buresch met with the Vice Chancellor and a
group of federal ministers to discuss strategies that could enhance the bill’s
passage. 140
The Education Minister, Dr. Czermak, described the legislative proposal
and stated that groupings would be predicated solely on “ethnic origin.”141
No other basis would be allowed. Another minister said that the

138. Id.
139. Die “Union” Im Abwehrkampf gegen das “Studentenrecht” [The “Union” fights
“Student Law”], DIE WAHRHEIT (Vienna) Dec. 18, 1931, at 4 (Translation Aces trans., 20012003) (translation on file with author).
140. Ministerratsprotokoll Nr. 748, 9, vom. 25. November 1931 [Minutes of the Council
of Ministers Meeting of November 25, 1931, No. 748, 9], passim (Translation Aces trans.
2001-2003) (translation on file with author).
141. Id. at 3.
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Government would be in a difficult situation if it presented the bill in
Parliament only to suffer defeat because of objections from opposing
parties. 142 If there were such a defeat, “certain events” could occur on
academic soil. This might lead to termination of University autonomy.
Therefore, it was “absolutely necessary” that the Chancellor speak to the
Social Democrats in advance.
In response, Dr. Czermak assured the officials present that important
parties were already behind the proposal, and indicated that he would
promote it with another powerful party, the Christian Socials. 143 He also
emphasized, however, that preparation for the debate must proceed “with
all due speed.” Members of the German Student Body were soon to meet
and would be angry if there were no message about the Government’s
intention to forward the legislation.
2.

The battle in Parliament

The debate in the National Council of the Austrian Parliament took place
on April 29, 1932. 144 The National Council generally held three separate
sessions on each proposed bill, and then voted. Members speaking for or
against the proposal sometimes elicited cheers or cat-calls by political
factions which were explicitly identified in the transcript of the
proceedings.
The bill designed to nullify the Constitutional Court’s decision was
entitled “A Law about a Student Order at Universities.” 145 In brief, it
proposed an amendment to the Associations Law stating that academic
authorities could approve the establishment of student associations under
the principle of ethnic origin.146 Approval may be granted “only” if this
association’s by-laws require students to “prove” their affiliation to a Volk
(people) on the grounds of ethnic extraction and language. 147
Introducing the legislation, Minister Czermak proceeded in bland

142. Id. at 4-5.
143. Id. at 5-6. Chancellor Buresch ended the discussion by stating that the
Government’s budget legislation must be passed in Parliament before presentation of the
student associations bill, because discussion of the latter might become too disruptive. He
directed the Education Minister to continue his lobbying efforts to revive the nations. Id.
144. Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2063.
145. 293 der Beilagen. Nationalrat. IV Gesetzgebungsperiode 1. Vorlage der
Bundesregierung, Bundesgesetz vom. 1932 über eine Studentenschaftsordnung an den
Hochschulen [National Council Bill of 1932 about a Student Body Order in Universities], at
1 (Translation Aces trans. 2001-2003) (translation on file with author).
146. Id.
147. Id. (noting also that no group except one based on ethnic origin would be permitted
under this bill).
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abstractions. He did not pursue the suggestion that a general student
representative body should be established with equal voting by all students.
Instead, he stressed the importance of preserving the “German character” of
the University through ethnic-origin guarantees.148 This would assure
peace and order and protect the students’ right of self-administration.
Without elaboration, he stated that the High Court’s decision had posed no
constitutional problem for a bill establishing separate student groups. He
did not discuss the difference between the decision’s use of the word
“nationality” with its implications of Austrian citizenship as a qualification
for membership in a German Student Body, and the bill’s repeated use of
the divisive word “ethnic origin” as a mandatory qualification.
The other speakers in this illuminating debate did not hold back from
addressing the real purpose of the bill: to prevent Jews from claiming an
Austrian identity and to exclude them from participation in the privileges of
the German Student Body. A Christian Social supporter of the legislation,
Council Member Richard Schmitz, teetered between complaining about
Austrian Jews and professing his affection for them. They are competitors
for jobs and adherents of the wrong political camp, he explained. 149 The
younger generation of German-Austrians are anti-Semitic in part because
they have difficulty advancing as doctors, jurists, philosophers. Yet the
Social Democratic party favors Jewish doctors (transcript notes “agreement
from the right”), and Jewish lawyers are rising in Social Democratic
circles. Most Jews are anti-clerical and vote for Social Democratic
candidates. He nonetheless expressed doubt about “racial” theories, noting
that such theories are still subjective and can change as scholarly opinion
develops. 150 He assured his hearers that he and other Catholics had no
hatred towards Jews as a people or as a “race,” and were aware of a duty to
love our neighbors (cry from the right, “very correct”). 151 Although
Christians and Jews don’t have the same beliefs, he suggested, they both
still worship the one God. In particular, he urged, we must not sin against
committed Jewish converts by denying their sincerity. Those who accept
our beliefs uprightly are in the religious sense our brothers (lively
agreement from the right).152 But, he concluded, that does not mean that
the Jewish convert is therefore a German. We (Christian Socials) favor this
legislation.
Militant approval was expressed by Dr. Franz Hueber, who made no
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2063-65.
Id. at 2077-78.
Id. at 2081.
Id. at 2078.
Id. at 2083.
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effort to tone down his message. It matters which “race” our judges,
advocates, doctors and teachers are, he stated.153 Workers, farmers,
everyone should be concerned about who is coming out of the universities.
We can distinguish between a German-blooded man and a Jew. Unfurling
statistics about the components of the student body, he noted that in the
winter semester of 1930/1931, there were 8285 students entitled to vote as
members of the German Student Body but only 932 Jewish students.
Germans are by far the largest group and therefore the German people
“have the right to judge and to rule the University.” 154 Hueber concluded
that it was the duty of every German-blooded member of this House to
fight for passage of the bill. (Transcript notes “applause on the extreme
right.”) 155
Opposing this view, former Under-Secretary of State for Education Otto
Glöckel gave a pungent presentation that focused on issues omitted by the
supporting speakers: the scale of the violence in the University, its sources,
and the hypocrisy of those who condoned the assaults. He noted that
German Student Body gangs formed rings, through which disfavored
students were forced to pass. 156 These gangs were armed with brass
knuckles, rubber truncheons, and even guns introduced into the school by
Hitler-based organizations. Twenty against one, and of course the twenty
are victors. The lives of impoverished students are made heavy by this and
their studies are hindered, but the nuances of anti-Semitism do not preclude
the University Rector from having afternoon tea with Mr. Rothschild.157
(Transcript notes a shout of “Quiet!” and interruptions from various
quarters. Presiding Officer pleads for order.) Ultimately, Glöckel
predicted, those who eat of the swastika will die from it. 158 (Merriment
from the left, cat-calls from the right).
One forgets, he continued, that state-sponsored universities exist to
provide an atmosphere in which all students are free to do research and to
learn. Every exception to such freedom violates the law. (Minister

153. Id. at 2090.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2092.
156. Id. at 2084-85.
157. Id. at 2084. According to Ernst Klebinder, the beleaguered editor whose
prosecution was the impetus for the Austrian Court’s desegregation decision, the Rector of
the University of Vienna went to Louis Rothschild, the head of the Rothschild family, to
assure him that there was “nothing in the new student regulations that is directed against the
Jews,” and to ask him to “make contributions to individual university institutes.” See From
the Courtroom, supra note 4, at 3.
158. Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2084.
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Czermak, interrupting: “There’s nothing one-sided in the bill”).159 Glöckel
responded that the administration is asking Parliament to shed its innocence
by joining with the agitators in an attempt to legalize an unconstitutional
incursion on the equality that is an attribute of citizenship. This is the first
step towards creation of a racist state. German mother-tongue is not
enough to entitle an applicant to membership in the German Student Body,
nor are five or ten prior generations of ancestors in Austria. We’re letting
fanatical youngsters dictate what equality of citizenship is, and to exclude
not only Jews but also any working-class Aryans who discomfit the young
Nazis. Kids who have never had to earn any money are saying to these
applicants, “you’re not a [worthy] German.” 160
Further opposition was voiced by a noted debater, Council Member Karl
Leuthner. He not only rebutted Minister Czermak’s justifications point-bypoint, but went on to illumine the German-Austrian culture and wisdom
that the bill would destroy. Members of the German Student Body, who
have been issued uniforms under the supervision of the Rector, have
continued to terrorize other students despite the Constitutional Court’s
decision. 161 Legalizing this regime and its protection by the Rector would
not establish law and order, he explained. Nor would it enshrine freedom
of association, because grouping by choice is not the reality here. The
Minister has claimed that membership in a student association is
completely voluntary and strongly stressed this principle. Yet members
can in their discretion deny admittance to others. And this admittance is
not merely to an association as a kind of student club, but to a governmentestablished Nation with very special features.162
And what does the word “race,” the basis for these groupings, actually
mean? 163 Nordics are only 10% of our population, he noted. Does that
leave us all as bastards, including Goethe, Schiller, and Beethoven, the
greatest musical genius in history? If it’s more important to be Nordic than
to be imbued with German culture, then what does it mean to be German?
Jews, who have been here for centuries, include writers and composers like
Heine and Mendelsohn who built our art and history. Education Minister
Czermak has acknowledged that someone who was not every-drop-ofblood German could be found in the German Student Body. Yes, Leuthner
commented sarcastically, neither Czermak nor Buresch are exactly German
names. But, those who speak our language as natives, who embrace our
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id. at 2084, 2087-88.
Id. at 2074.
Id. at 2066.
Id.
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culture, and who are fulfilled by our spirit, are German even if their family
names are not.
He continued with the question, must the cross bow to the swastika?164
Minister Czermak has said that baptized Jews will nevertheless be placed in
the Jewish group and not in the German Student Body. Therefore,
somebody could be German in culture, language, and ideals with three
Catholic grandparents and generations of Catholic ancestors, but “if one of
his grandmothers has just a smidgeon of Jewish blood, this Jewish blood is
stronger than the baptism of centuries . . . .” 165 Catholic theorists and
writers have condemned the “myth of blood” and the “race principle.”
Minister Czermak, you say this “principle” is German. Yet students
from Germany have published a letter from the German Catholic Center
and democratic student organizations urging you to “ensure the
establishment in Austria’s universities of a student association not legally
anchored in the brutal despotism of a party but rather based on the principle
of citizenship by operation of law . . . .” 166
The Minister’s proposed legislation denies everything that is significant
in Austrian culture and destroys its entire spiritual capital. It violates
association law, republican and democratic principles, and the rights of
workers, Leuthner concluded. We will fight you because passage of this
bill would constitute the first legal recognition of the blood and race
theories of the Nazis! 167 (Clapping from the left).
After this intense debate in the National Council, the bill was referred to
a Parliamentary Committee. It was scheduled for a second reading, but
was never debated again and disappeared. 168
G. The Dwindling of Democracy: Riots and a Repressive
Constitution
As the history of segregation in America and Austria demonstrates,
moral rights are fragile without the support of powerful institutions. Jim
Crow laws in the South subjugated all Blacks, regardless of class, character
or learning. A Southern politician justified disenfranchisement by
proclaiming that no Black in the world could measure up to “the least,
poorest, lowest-down white man I ever knew.” 169 Two branches of the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 2071.
Id. at 2072.
Id. at 2074.
Id. at 2093.
See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 107 (2d ed. 1966).
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federal government eventually acted to dismantle Jim Crow. When the
judiciary rejected “separate but equal” schools in Brown, it was proceeding
in accord with the executive. President Harry S. Truman had issued orders
prohibiting discrimination in federal employment and ending segregation in
the armed forces. 170
By contrast, the Austrian court stood alone in overturning the
segregation edict, opposed rather than buttressed by the executive.171 The
subsequent administration of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, which will be
discussed below, abided by the Court’s 1931 ruling but engineered
constitutional changes that curtailed the judiciary’s prior independence and
jurisdiction.
1.

The Rise of Authoritarian Austria

The riots that followed the High Court’s decision caught the attention of
eminent members of the American Medical Association who were officials
of a league for the protection of foreign students in Vienna. 172 These
physicians protested to the Austrian government, to the American envoy in
Austria, to the Rector of the University of Vienna, to President Herbert
Hoover, and to all United States newspapers with wide circulation. The
protest letter called the Nazi students “cowardly” and noted that the Rector
had failed to protect the victims, some of whom were American medical
students. 173 The American envoy continued to issue objections and
warnings as subsequent waves of anti-Semitic student violence occurred.
These objections were viewed as hypocritical by an Austrian journal,
which proclaimed that racial segregation was strictly enforced in the
American South against anyone having a drop of Black blood. 174 The
young Christian Social Chancellor of Austria, Engelbert Dollfuss,
expressed sympathy, however, with the American position, indicating
annoyance with the “gross stupidity” of the Nazi students and promising
assistance. 175 Dollfuss was not only responding to foreign pressure,176 but
170. Id. at 136; see also infra Part II.B.1.b.
171. The legislature abandoned further discussion of the executive’s proposed
segregation bill, but never voted on it. See supra Part I.F.2 and note 168.
172. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 128.
173. Id. George Earle, the American envoy, publicly announced that trade relations with
America could be adversely affected unless the Austrian Government rejected
discrimination based on ethnic origin. See id. at 265.
174. Id. at 265.
175. Id. at 129. This statement was made in a meeting with the American Ministry after a
flare-up of violence in 1932, where Nazis set upon Jewish students with steel clubs and
knives, injuring several Americans.
176. Id. Envoys from other governments joined America’s protest, which was publicized
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also acting to block an Anschluss with Germany following Hitler’s 1933
consolidation of power there. 177
Abandonment of Austria’s prior democratic institutions was Dollfuss’s
method of enforcing his goals. Two months after Hitler became the
German Chancellor, all three speakers of the Austrian Parliament resigned
in an argument over a minor voting procedure.178 Dollfuss took this
opportunity to declare that Parliament had suspended itself and that he
would now rule under an unrepealed Emergency Decree promulgated at the
time of the First World War. 179 Realizing that the Nazis had been winning
local elections, Dollfuss refused to allow Parliament to reconvene. 180 In a
series of dramatic moves, he outlawed the Communist Party and the Nazi
Party, and forbade future elections.181 Socialist workers in Linz, protesting
these increasing signs of dictatorship, staged a revolt that was crushed in
three days. 182 Dollfuss outlawed the Social Democratic Party in February
1934, and vast numbers of its members were arrested.183
An authoritarian corporate state had now supplanted Austrian
democracy, and inaugurated a new Constitution that ultimately fostered the
swift establishment of segregation when the Nazis came to full power.
This Constitution crafted crucial changes in the civil liberties of Austrian
citizens, and replaced the Constitutional Court with a new Constitutional
and Administrative Court (Bundesgerichtshof) that merged two prior
tribunals to form a new entity with drastically reduced powers.184 Only
four of the fourteen High Court Justices who had struck down the Nazi
Student Orders were favored with an appointment to this new

in Austria and abroad. The newly elected Rector of the University apologized to the
American envoy, and threatened to expel or even institute criminal prosecution against
disorderly students. A pro-Nazi newspaper characterized this apology as humiliating, and
noted that students who had Jewish names were not really American, regardless of
citizenship. Id.
177. Id. at 261. The Austrian government, as a condition of accepting a loan, had to
agree with a League of Nations prohibition against union with Germany. Anton Staudinger,
‘Austria’-The Ideology of Austrofacism, in AUSTRIA IN THE THIRTIES: CULTURE AND
POLITICS 8 (Kenneth Segar & John Warren eds. 1991) [hereinafter AUSTRIA IN THE
THIRTIES].
178. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 260.
179. Kenneth Segar & John Warren, Preface to AUSTRIA IN THE THIRTIES, supra note
177, at i, ii. This move had been supported by Benito Mussolini, the leader of Italy, who
appeared at the time to be a protector of Dollfuss.
180. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 260-61.
181. Id. at 186, 261-62; Segar & Warren, supra note 179, at ii-iii.
182. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 147, 266.
183. FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 96; Segar & Warren, supra note 179, at iii.
184. AUS. CONST. art. 163 (1934); GULICK, supra note 63, passim.
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replacement. 185
2.

How the 1934 Constitution Deconstructed Individual Rights and
Liberties

Austria is a democratic republic and its law emanates from the people,
said the Constitution that had governed in 1929. 186 In 1934, the new
Constitution’s preamble proclaimed: “In the Name of Almighty God from
Whom All Justice Emanates, the Austrian People Receives for its Christian
German Federal State on a Corporative Foundation this Constitution.” 187
Appropriately, the country’s coat of arms metamorphosed from a singleheaded eagle with a crown on its head 188 to a double-headed eagle topped
by a halo. 189
A Constitution that accorded comprehensive individual rights had been
replaced by one sporting a Bill of Rights perforated by amorphous
exceptions. The 1934 creation abolished universal suffrage and established
a “corporative” regime where the interests of state-defined groups
transcend those of individuals. 190 Representatives are selected with
administration approval only from these groups, allowing for top-down
control over the results.
This system inaugurated a government of men, not of laws, although it
operated through a constant effusion of new statutes. Concepts of equality,
association, and citizenship were distorted and undermined by the
Constitution itself and by the legislation purporting to implement it,
creating only an illusion of national unity.

185. Oesterreichisches Amts-Kalendar fur das Jahr 1936 59. Jahrgang des hof-und
Staatshandbuches, II Abschnitt Bundesgerichtshof [Austrian Calendar and Handbook for
Bundesgerichtshof, 1936] (showing new slate of Justices with only Ernst Durig (the
President of the prior Constitutional Court), Georg Froehlich (the Vice-President of the prior
Court), and Justices Hermann Eckel and Adolf Wanschura on the roster). The 1933
calendar and handbook for the Constitutional Court showed ten other Justices who had
participated in the vote on the Nazi Student Orders: Ludwig Adamovich, Matthias
Bernegger, Friedrich Engel, Jakob Freundlich, Ernst Ganzwohl, Max Kulisch, Artur
Lenhoff, Friedrich Mathias, Georg Pockels, and Hermann Prey. Amts-Kalendar 1933 68.
Jahrgang.
186. AUS. CONST. art. I (1929).
187. AUS. CONST. preamble (1934).
188. AUS. CONST. art. 8a (1929).
189. AUS. CONST. art. 3 (1934). The double-headed eagle had been previously used as a
symbol in the Byzantine era, see OXFORD DICTIONARY OF BYZANTIUM Vol. 1 (1991), but
apparently without a halo.
190. GULICK, supra note 63, at 1429-30.

CHRISTENSENMARCUS

2004]

2/3/2011 9:57 PM

AUSTRIA’S PRE-WAR BROWN
a)

135

Equality

The 1929 Constitution contained not only a broad “equality principle,”
but also the more specific provisions imported from the Treaty of SaintGermain that prohibited invidious discrimination against minorities.191 All
federal nationals were “equal before the law;” none could acquire
privileges based on religion, sex, or class.192 Austrians who belonged to
racial, religious, or other minorities must be accorded the same security in
law and in fact as other Austrian nationals.
The 1934 version retained these words, but twisted the “equal before the
law” term by adding: “They may be treated unequally in the laws only so
far as objective grounds afford justification.” 193 The safeguards for
minorities could be trumped by the card of justified inequality, a card held
securely by the Dollfuss administration.
The drafters’ notion of
objectively-grounded distinctions was exemplified by a provision stating
that although hiring for government posts was “independent of religion,”
exceptions to this principle could be created by law as to teachers.194
Subordination of the constitutional “principle” to ordinary statutory
enactments was thus secured in advance.
In a democratically-inclined society like America in the early 1950’s, the
Austrian Saint-Germain-based 1929 Constitution could provide a superior
model for the drafting of equal protection terminology. Consider the more
specific guarantees that minorities must be accorded “the same
treatment . . . in law and in fact” as those in the majority group. The word
“same” becomes an additional obstacle to segregation-inclined judges and
legislators. The insistence on equality “in fact” defends against the
argument that enforced segregation is permissible even where the majority
group has most of the power. The “in fact” reference focuses on context
and implementation.
In the authoritarian Austrian society of 1934, whose rulers did not see
sovereignty as residing in the people, this rigorous draftsmanship was
dismantled by the new Constitution’s bald statement that inequality may be
introduced at will by “stipulation” or law. A contemporary commentator
noted that all the constitutional terms were “extraordinarily pliable,”
because they could be abrogated by a simple cabinet resolution marked

191. See supra Part I.C.
192. AUS. CONST. art. 7 (1929).
193. AUS. CONST. art. 16 (1934). Women could be denied equal rights if “the law decrees
otherwise.” Id.
194. AUS. CONST. art. 27 (1934).
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with the right label. 195 The 1934 Constitution was thus casually
announcing that despite its heavenly origin, it was not the supreme law of
the land.
b)

Association

Prior formulations of association law were not essentially altered by the
1934 Constitution, in part because those earlier versions stemmed from an
1867 statute heavily laced with restrictions. Emperor Franz Joseph
permitted this statute as an expression of largesse towards his people; they
could form various kinds of groups providing inter alia that they registered
Later
with the police and received permission to continue.196
developments established a fundamental right to form associations and
allowed mere registration to suffice as to many categories of associations,
but the potential for supervision remained.197
This prominent aspect of Austrian law gave the Dollfuss administration
hands-on control not only over existing organizations but over all new
citizen groups coalescing for expressive or political purposes.198 The 1867
law, however, did recognize one aspect of freedom—association was
voluntary. You had to follow rules in order to organize a group, but you
could not be forced to join one. This aspect was emphasized by the
Constitutional Court when it nullified the Nazi Student Orders, finding that
they created compulsory divisions not permitted by the relevant statutes.
The administration fully honored that nullification ruling. Archival
documents show that German Student Body groups at various Austrian
universities were being dissolved in 1933-1935, and that dissolution was
often accompanied by a seizure of their property. 199 When the German

195. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1450.
196. Reichs-Gesetz. Blatt für das Kaiserthum Oesterreich, Jahrgang 1867 L VIII Stück
134 Gesetz vom. 15 November 1867 Ueber das Vereinsrecht [November 1867 law
concerning the right to associate] (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file
with author).
197. See, e.g., ERNST MAYRHOFER, HANDBUCH FÜR DEN POLITISCHEN
VERWALTUNGSDIENST II [MANUAL FOR POLITICAL AMINISTRATION] 97 (5th ed. 1896)
(Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003); Adolf Merkl, JURISTISCHER BLAETTER Vol. 61, No.
23, Dec. 17, 1932, at 1 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with
author).
198. See infra note 200.
199. See Der Sicherheitsdirektor für das Bundesland Steiermark [Director of Security for
the Federal Province of Styria], Ref. No. 384 De 32/2-1934, Graz. 20 Aug. 1934 (directing
siezure of the assets of the German Student Association) (Translation Aces trans., 20012003) (translation on file with author); see also PAULEY, supra note 2, at 264-65 (noting that
Dollfuss revoked Vienna University’s academic autonomy, allowed police officers to enter
the institution when necessary, and forbade the wearing of Nazi uniforms there).
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Student Body in Innsbruck appealed to the Chancellor to prevent its
demise, the reply was that compulsory organizations were impermissible
under Austrian law. 200 This bow to associational freedom fended off
further efforts to segregate by Nations, and also produced the political
advantage of eliminating organizations that were increasingly controlled by
their counterparts in Nazi Germany. 201
Indeed, each governmental use of the control emanating from
associations law was skillfully designed to weaken opponents of the
Chancellor’s top-down political apparatus. The Government blocked the
emergence of certain voluntary and peaceful groups while relentlessly
“encouraging” citizens to join its own favored political organization, the
Fatherland Front. 202
This pattern underlines a salient feature of associational liberty: its
vitality is wholly dependent on equal protection and citizenship guarantees.
By perforating the right to equal treatment, the new Constitution facilitated
increasingly arbitrary distinctions among individuals who wished to pursue
some common purpose through collective effort. By establishing a
corporative political structure, the Constitution check-mated electoral
power to reverse that erosion of associational freedom.
c)

Citizenship

The 1934 Constitution’s abolition of universal voting rights for citizens
was radical and undisguised. 203 Under the prior system, every man and
woman over twenty had complete and equal suffrage in elections of
representatives to the National Council of Parliament and to the state
legislatures (diets). 204 These representative had protected the interests of

200. Zu lesen: Voŕekten und Vorlagebericht I Gegenschrift des Bundeskanzleramtes [For
Reading: Introduction and Presentation Report I, Answer by the Office of the Federal
Chancellor] (Jan. 1934) (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with
author).
201. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 265.
202. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1432. The 1934 Constitution had added a new
provision stating that federal citizens had the right to form associations “within the limits of
the law.” These “limits” barred Catholic and Socialist workers from forming the kinds of
trade unions they desired.
Conversely, when the government wished to promote membership in an association,
its efforts were unstinting. After dissolution of the Socialist, Nazi, and Social Democratic
Parties, Dollfuss had created the “Fatherland Front” as an ostensible unifying body. Id. at
1485. Jobless workers filing for unemployment benefits had to fill out a form with the
question: “What is the number of your Fatherland Front membership card?” Id. Taxpayers
who were not members could face inflated claims by tax collectors. Id.
203. For an account of devices used to pass this Constitution, see id. at 1404 et seq.
204. AUS. CONST. art. 24 (1929). The federal government was composed of autonomous
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widely divergent societal constituencies.
This system was replaced by a hierarchy of appointed and designated
councils and assemblies. In brief, the Bundestag—a deciding legislative
body—was composed of deputies from Councils whose members were
appointed by the President and approved by the Chancellor, or in some
degree dependent on the Chancellor for their positions. 205 Although these
Council deputies were drawn from various groups, including recognized
religious or educational bodies or financial representatives from State
government, the common thread was that they all had to be “loyal
patriotic” citizens.206 Membership in the Fatherland Front was a minimum
requirement in proving patriotism. As a further safeguard against impulses
towards independence, the Constitution deprived legislators of their prior
immunity from criminal prosecution for statements made in legislative
sessions. 207
A chief legal spokesman for the Dollfuss regime, Dr. Robert Hecht,
explained that one of the “advantages” of the 1934 Constitution was that
Bundestag members would no longer have “so-called political control”
over administration action. Certain former legislative powers had been
abolished, he frankly stated, because they would be “incompatible with
authoritarian direction of the state.” 208
The new system also shielded the President from accountability to the
citizenry. He was now to be voted into office by regional officials, from a
nomination slate of three names proposed by an assembly of the
subservient Councils described above. 209 Under the old 1929 Constitution,
Austrian citizens had elected the President by equal and direct vote.210
The government’s creation of this apparatus was motivated in part by the
desire to suppress Austrian Nazis. 211 For this reason, the Viennese Jewish
community generally trusted Dollfuss, concluding that the remaining
alternative was not Democratic Socialism but National Socialism. 212 The
administration had destroyed all political outlets except the Fatherland
Front, and citizens had to make the best of it. As Sigmund Freud put it,
“[F]rom our home-grown fascism we could put up with all sorts of things,
states. Id. art. 2.
205. AUS. CONST. arts. 46-51 (1934); see GULICK, supra note 63, at 1430.
Chancellor also retained emergency powers. Id. at 1447.
206. Id. at 1429, 1444.
207. Id. at 1444.
208. Id. at 1446-47.
209. AUS. CONST. art. 73 (1934).
210. AUS. CONST. art. 60 (1929).
211. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 261.
212. See FREIDENREICH, supra note 129, at 195.
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for it would certainly not treat us as badly as its German cousin
would . . . .” 213
Dollfuss was assassinated in July, 1934, apparently by Austrian
Nazis, 214 and was succeeded by his Minister of Justice, Kurt von
Schuschnigg. 215 Like Dollfuss, Schuschnigg never made anti-Semitic
statements, and his administration punished physical attacks on Jews in the
universities and elsewhere. 216 Yet he allowed arbitrary dismissal of Jewish
teachers and preclusion of Jews from most government positions.217 The
Fatherland Front segregated Jewish children in its youth organization. 218
The authoritarian structure of the Dollfuss-Schuschnigg regime
ultimately moved the country towards segregation and Nazism, rather than
away from them as claimed. The incursions on citizenship established in
the 1934 Constitution did nothing to prevent a more rapacious dictatorship
from taking root in Austria. Indeed, these incursions facilitated the
subsequent public acceptance of the Hitler regime. 219
d)

Judicial Independence

An American scholar, Malbone W. Graham, Jr., noted in 1924 that “the
doctrine of judicial supremacy is raised to a higher degree in the Austrian
Constitution than in any other extant.” 220 The Constitutional Court’s
refusal to countenance segregation of university students had reflected this
independence. 221 That decision had a significance far greater than its
immediate holding because it warded off the commencement of a racist
process of destruction. As historian Raul Hillberg has observed, “[e]ach
step of a destructive process contains the seed of the next step.”222
Chancellor Dollfuss, however, used the new Constitution to curb the
judiciary’s independence and to drain its authority over any aspect of his
administration’s rapidly burgeoning program. The former Constitutional
Court’s merger with the Administrative Court to create a new entity was
213. Dieter A. Binder, The Corporate State Versus National Socialism: Some Aspects of
Austria’s Resistance, in AUSTRIA IN THE THIRTIES, supra note 177, at 77.
214. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 263.
215. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1405.
216. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 260, 265, 268.
217. See id. at 270, 272. But see id. at 267 indicating that a few Jews, generally Zionists,
were appointed to high positions.
218. Id. at 273.
219. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1416.
220. GRAHAM, supra note 52, at 180.
221. The ruling itself was acceptable to the Dollfuss regime, because it underlined the
government’s opposition to Nazi Germany. See also supra note 213.
222. RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 54 (1985).
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accomplished by emergency decrees of dubious legality, which gave the
President unencumbered power to appoint all the judges. 223 As noted
earlier, the vast majority of the former Constitutional Court’s Justices were
not returned to the new tribunal.224 Although the 1934 Constitution did
give this tribunal jurisdiction over the constitutionality of federal and state
laws, another provision added that such jurisdiction did not extend to laws
issued prior to July 1, 1934. 225 That manipulation neatly precluded judicial
review of all the Dollfuss legislation that had poured out in the prior year.
As to post-1934 enactments, citizens claiming violations of civil liberties
such as political speech could not seek review in the High Court in several
categories of cases. For example, someone distributing handbills deemed
by the police to be likely to wound propriety or disturb public order could
be convicted of an administrative offense, with no judicial review if the
sentence was below a certain number of months. 226 Such a person could
also lose his license to do business. A particularly ominous decree
provided that a citizen “assumed” to be guilty of acts or omissions inimical
to the state or cabinet could be detained indefinitely; an appeal could be
taken to the federal Chancellor, but not to the judiciary. 227
Because Austria was threatened by a powerful external enemy, drastic
measures were necessary, Chancellor Dollfuss emphasized. In an interview
with a correspondent for the London Evening Standard, Dollfuss stated that
the peril of forcible Anshluss with Germany justified his methods: “I am no
dictator; I am a democrat . . . . My faith in the principles of the democratic
form of government is unshaken. But the question now is not one of
democracy; it is one of self-preservation. . . . [T]he choice is between
Austria and no Austria.” 228 This explanation has some initial appeal.
Austria was geographically placed between Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s
Germany and the international community showed little interest in this
dilemma. 229 Therefore, the administration reasoned, that they were
compelled to authorize indefinite detention of those who would otherwise
hand Austria over to foreign powers. The Constitution is not a suicide

223. See AUS. CONST. art. 163, art. 177(2) (1934); GULICK, supra note 63, at 1074 et seq.
224. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
225. See AUS. CONST. art. 170 (1934); Art. 53 of the Constitutional Law of June 19, 1934
(which had the same status as provisions appearing in the Constitution itself); GULICK,
supra note 63, at 1421; supra note 93.
226. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1466.
227. Id. at 1468. This was of particular concern with respect to unsupported anonymous
accusations. Id. at 1469.
228. Id. at 1077; see also PAULEY, supra note 2, at 261. But cf. Binder, supra note 213, at
71 (discussing German terrorist activities in Austria).
229. GULICK, supra note 63, at 1857.
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pact. 230
That justification loses plausibility because the government was
unwilling to subject its detention decrees and other repressive measures to
judicial review. There was no High Court with the authority to distinguish
between criminals and innocent citizens and to bar anonymous charges.
The paradigm example of the regime’s own unwillingness to make such
distinctions is the case of Karl Leuthner.
Leuthner was the anti-Nazi debater who had so eloquently opposed the
prior administration’s attempt to launch a segregation bill in Parliament.231
In 1934, he was arrested and interned for six months. 232 As one
commentator concluded, the internment of “this patently unrevolutionary
anti-Marxist and errant outsider . . . can only be interpreted as a precaution
acknowledging Leuthner’s substantial popular following.” 233 After his
release, Leuthner never again made a public statement, and died in 1944. 234
In July 1936, Schuschnigg made an agreement with Hitler to legalize the
Austrian Nazi Party and permit Nazi rallies in exchange for Germany’s
promise to recognize Austria’s independence.235
The DollfussSchuschnigg administration’s attempt to suppress independence in its
judiciary and citizenry was more successful than its abandoned attempt to
suppress local Nazi activists.
Hitler did not keep his pledge to preserve Austria’s independence. His
plan to take over Austria had been organized even before he became
Germany’s Chancellor in 1933, 236 and had been implemented step-by-step
with the aid of collaborators. 237 The danger of such a takeover had exerted
an increasing threat to the independence of the Austrian Constitutional
Court and its successor. By contrast, no external peril hampered the United
States Supreme Court as it undertook the disavowal of Plessy.

230. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S.
500, 509 (1964); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
231. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
232. Roger Fletcher, Socialist Nationalism in Central Europe Before 1914: The Case Of
Karl Leuthner, 17 CANADIAN J. HIST. 30 (1982).
233. Id. at 43.
234. Id. at 30.
235. DEBORAH DWORK & ROBERT JAN VAN PELT, HOLOCAUST: A HISTORY 94 (2002).
236. WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 120 (1960).
237. See infra note 235.
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H. Anschluss and Enforced Segregation

Germany’s 1935 racist Nuremberg decrees 238 were accompanied by the
following order:
The first main goal of the German measures must be strict segregation of
Jewry from the rest of the population. . . . Then immediately, the wearing
of the recognition sign consisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought
about and all rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. . . . Any
cultural activity will be completely forbidden, to the Jew. This includes
the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish theatres, and schools. 239

Hitler’s Anschluss with Austria succeeded in March 1938, and brought
with it these segregation goals. 240 Chancellor Schuschnigg’s oppositional
efforts were fatally undermined by his continuing failure to cooperate with
democratic elements which might have been his natural allies,241 and by
Minutes after
international indifference to Austria’s isolation.242
Schuschnigg announced his resignation, local Nazis took control. 243 Here
began the precipitous fall that had been held off for seven years by the
Constitutional Court’s refusal to permit the first step––enforced separation
of university students.
1.

The Disappearance of Diversity

The effect of Nazi racism on universities was devastating. At the
University of Vienna, 50% of the Law School faculty was fired for having
the wrong religion or the wrong opinions, as was 66% of the philosophy
faculty and more than 50% of the medical faculty. 244 Sigmund and Anna

238. These decrees were issued on September 15, 1935. See description in the Avalon
Project: Nuremberg Trial Proceedings, Vol. 2., Second Day, at 27, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/11-21-45.htm.
239. Id.
240. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 275.
241. Binder, supra note 213, at 76-77; GULICK, supra note 63, at 1858.
242. See GULICK, supra note 63, at 1857.
243. Id. at 1847-48. Schuschnigg had hoped that holding a plebiscite on March 13, 1938
deciding whether Austria should remain independent of Germany, would result in a vote
against Anschluss. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 279. Hitler’s troops arrived, however, on
March 12, 1938. Id. In his resignation speech, Schuschnigg stated that Hitler’s claims that
German assistance was needed to quell disorder in Austrian streets were “fabrications from
A to Z.” GULICK, supra note 63, at 1846-47. His speech concluded with “a heart-felt wish:
God protect Austria.” Id.
244. BRIGITTE LICHTENBERGER-FENZ, UNIVERSITAETEN 1938- AUSSCJ;ISS UND
VERFOLGUNG OESTERREICHISCHER WISSENSCHAFTLERRINEN IM NATIONALSOZIALISMUS [THE
UNIVERSITIES IN 1938: THE EXCLUSION AND PERSECUTION OF AUSTRIAN ACADEMICS UNDER
NATIONAL SOCIALISM] 6 (Translation Aces trans., 2001-2003) (translation on file with
author) [hereinafter FENZ II]. Professors were required to swear allegiance to Hitler. Id. at
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Freud fled, Nobel prize winners were banished, and entire branches of
scientific inquiry disappeared.245 The diversity of thought that had
enriched the University and brought international acclaim was
impoverished. 246
Three key figures in the invalidation of the Nazi Student Orders were
affected by the Anschluss in strikingly different ways. Justice Arthur
Lenhoff of the Constitutional Court, who had persistently argued that the
Student Orders were unconstitutional under the equality principle, escaped
from Austria in 1938 and emigrated to America where he became a law
professor, practitioner, and author of two casebooks and numerous law
review articles. 247 Constitutional Court Justice Ludwig Adamovich was
forced to retire from public life in 1938, but after the war became President
of the Austrian Constitutional Court when it was revived by the Allies.248
Joseph Hupka, a Dean of Vienna Law School who had taken the lead in
challenging the Student Orders in the public press,249 was arrested by the
Nazis in 1938 and sent to Theresienstadt concentration camp where he
perished. 250
2.

The Success of Segregation

Hitler had expressed impatience with the Christian Socials for

4. The only discipline at the University of Vienna that was untouched by the purge was
history.
See David F. Crew, Book Review, [WILLFÄHRIGE WISSENSCHAFT: DIE
UNIVERSITAET WIEN, 1938-45, OESTERREICHISCHE TEXTE ZUR GESELLSCHAFTSKRITIK], Vol.
43 (Gernot Heiss et al. eds., 1989).
245. FENZ II, supra note 244, at 7.
246. In contemporary America, establishing a diverse faculty still remains problematic.
African-Americans comprise only 3% of the faculty in predominantly white institutions and
5% of faculty nationwide. Ryan Heffernan, Faculty Diversity Still Tops Priority List,
HEIGHTS, at http://www.bcheights.com/news/2003/02/04/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2004); Cathy
A. Trower & Richard P. Chait, Faculty Diversity: Too Little For Too Long, HARV. MAG., at
http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line.030218.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2004).
247. Saul Touster, Arthur Lenhoff, ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 1965 Proceedings Pt. 1-10,
at 143-46. In 1963, the Austrian government gave former Justice Lenhoff an award for
distinguished intellectual endeavors. Id. at 145.
248. ISABELLA ACKERL & FRIEDRICH WEISSENSTEINER, OESTERREICHISCHES PERSONEN
LEXIKON 8 (1992).
249. See Dr. Joseph Hupka, Die Studenten Ordnung der Universität Wien [The Student
Regulations of the University of Vienna], NEUE FREIE PRESSE (Vienna) Apr. 23, 1930, at 1.
Dr. Hupka, after parsing the disingenuous language of the regulations, concluded that very
few if any law professors or jurists believed that these regulations were properly grounded
in law.
250. See Juridische Fakultät und Rechtsstudium an der Universität Wien 1365-1997, Ein
Überblick von Ilse Reiter, VII. 1938-1945 [Law Faculty and Law Study at the University of
Vienna, 1365-1997, An Overview by Ilsa Reiter, VII, 1938-1945], available at
http://www.juridicum.at/studium/fakg_08.htm.
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predicating anti-Semitism on religion, rather than on understanding that
“Jews are not in any ultimate sense a religious community but a race.”251
The Nuremberg laws defined a “full blooded” Jew as anyone who practiced
the religion (which increased the taint) and had two Jewish grandparents, or
someone who did not and had at least three Jewish grandparents. 252
Implementation of segregation based on these Nazi theories was far
swifter in Austria than it had been in Germany. 253 Within a month of the
Nazi takeover, the 16,000 Jewish youngsters in Viennese primary and
secondary schools were put in separate classes, then later transferred to
eight all-Jewish schools, and by the following year barred from public
schools altogether. 254 Jewish students were eventually excluded from
universities. 255 By January 1939, Jews could not enter public parks, sports
stadiums, or sleeping and dining cars on trains.256 Landlords could
terminate any lease made with a Jewish tenant. 257 Jewish doctors and
lawyers were forbidden to treat Gentile patients and clients.258 A stream of
such legislation––250 different edicts––added a grotesque veneer of
legality to these measures. 259 The “first” goal of the Nuremberg decrees
had been achieved.
II.
United States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black noted at a court
conference on the Brown case that Hitler’s creed of segregation and racial
inferiority did not seem to differ markedly from the views of White
Southerners about the necessity of keeping the races apart.260 This point
had also occurred to many Black Americans, who saw the World War II
fascist enemy abroad in somewhat the same light as the Southern enemy at
251. Kurt Rudolf Fisher, The Death of “Austrian Philosophy,” in AUSTRIA IN THE
THIRTIES, supra note 177, at 302-03.
252. See PAULEY, supra note 2, at 208.
253. Id. at 286.
254. Id. at 290.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. HILBERG, supra note 222, at 171. A lease could be terminated upon a showing by
the landlord that the tenant could live somewhere else. Id. Simultaneously, Jews who still
maintained their apartments were compelled to accept homeless Jewish families as tenants.
Id. At this time Austria had been absorbed into Germany and was governed by its decrees.
PAULEY, supra note 2, at 230.
258. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 290.
259. Id.
260. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT, 1961-1991, at 142 (1997); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change,
and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 24-25 (1994).
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home. 261 Professor Fredrickson observes, however, that a systematic
comparison between White supremacy in the southern United States and
Nazi Germany’s treatment of Jews must be made, and suggests parallels. 262
I will explore below the similarities between Austrian and American
segregationist regimes as to the mystiques they invoked and the
prohibitions they developed, and will also identify substantial differences
in context. This comparison will focus on the judiciary’s uncomfortable
role in disestablishing school segregation. The rule of law in Austria was
both the product of a traditional culture and at war with prevailing power
differentials. The Brown and McLaurin decisions and their aftermath pitted
national law against deeply engrained Southern practices. These conflicts
provide lessons forward as to current debates on issues of equality,
association, and citizenship.
A.

The Minority’s Taint and the Majority’s Resultant Right to
Segregate

Racism reflects a mind-set that views the out-group as different from the
in-group in ways that are so crucial and unchangeable that the two groups
cannot coexist, except perhaps on the basis of domination and
subjugation. 263 Austrian Nazis and Southern segregationists proclaimed
that unless their regimes were protected by whatever measures were
necessary, contamination would overwhelm traditional society.
1.

The Myth of Blood

Although the Nazis and the designers of the Jim Crow laws transformed
inequality into an official ideology, rationalizations for twentieth century
racism predated these bureaucratized regimes. To cite a few examples,
many Europeans in medieval times conceived of Jews as accomplices of
Satan. 264 Wilhelm Marr, who founded the Anti-Semitic League in
Germany, warned in an 1879 book that Jews were tainted by nature rather
than merely having the wrong religious views.265 In America, nineteenth
century pro-slavery advocates who wished to avoid clashing with the
evangelical Christian belief that all people descend from Adam, asserted
that God had cursed the supposedly Black descendants of Noah’s son Ham

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

NEIL A. WYNN, THE AFRO-AMERICAN AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR 6-10 (1976).
FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 99.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 21-22.
PAULEY, supra note 2, at 28-29.
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and condemned them to be “servants unto servants.” 266 And in a debate on
an 1875 civil rights bill in Congress, John Harris of Virginia stated that
“[t]here is not one gentleman upon this floor who can honestly say he really
believes that the colored man is created his equal.”267
Twentieth-century racists carried forward these views. An Austrian
Nazi attempting to push through the 1932 segregation bill in Parliament
noted: “We can distinguish between a German-blooded man and a Jew.”268
Arguing in opposition, Karl Leuthner rejected the “myth of blood” which
would decree that someone could be German-Austrian in language and
culture with generations of Catholic ancestors, but if one grandmother has
“just a smidgeon of Jewish blood, this Jewish blood is stronger than the
baptism of centuries . . . .” 269 As to the smidgeon of Negro blood sufficient
to “taint” in the Jim Crow American South, Charles S. Mangum, Jr.’s
account of the 1940’s listed states that defined a person of color as one with
any ascertainable trace of Black blood or any Black blood, although there
were other variations using blood percentages. 270 The question of who was
Black was defined by Whites, and the pejorative nature of that definition
was demonstrated by the fact that “Every court which has considered the
question has held that writing that a white man is a Negro is libelous per
se.” 271
Because the dominant (pure) group could be contaminated by sexual
contact, Nazis and southern segregationists were particularly obsessed
about “race mixing” and enacted miscegenation laws to punish it.272 Hitler
accused both Jews and Blacks of attempting to ruin the White (read, Aryan)
race by “bastardization” that would throw Whites down from their “cultural
and political height.” 273
2.

The Myth of the Majority’s Moral Superiority

Loss of political height is a casualty of war rather than intermarriage,

266. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 79-80.
267. 2 Cong. Rec. 376 (Jan. 5, 1874) (colloquy between Rep. Harris and Rep. Ransier).
268. Parliamentary Debate, supra note 27, at 2090.
269. Id. at 2071.
270. CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 5-10 (1940); cf. Daniel
Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States, 112 YALE L.J. 1473, 1476-77
(2003) (concluding that there was greater flexibility than has been previously assumed).
271. MANGUM, supra note 270, at 18.
272. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 172; see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967)
(declaring miscegenation laws to be unconstitutional). Nicholas D. Kristof notes that there
is about ten times more genetic difference within a race than between races. Nicholas D.
Kristof, Love and Race, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 6, 2002, at A35.
273. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 119-120.
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and fuels humiliation that may be assuaged by subordinating some internal
“enemy.” The subordination process requires stigmatizing this enemy and
elevating the in-group. The Treaty of Saint-Germain, binding on Austria
after her defeat in World War I, was more severe than the Treaty of
Versailles that bound Germany. 274 Austria was forced to cede most of her
former imperial territory and was precluded from joining the new German
republic. Many kinds of Jews––“revolutionaries,” bankers, refugees from
the former eastern provinces––were conveniently blamed for this defeat
and the inflation that followed. 275 These alleged miscreants were
contrasted to the true German-Austrian people “filled with the life force,”
idealistic, pious, poetic, honorable. 276
In the American Civil War, White Southerners not only experienced a
high casualty rate but also lost their chance for an independent Confederacy
and much of their prior economic viability. They resented the AfricanAmericans who joined the Union Army, and those who later voted
Republican in the Reconstruction era dominated by northern
“Carpetbaggers.” 277 The insolvency of some Republican-dominated state
governments in which Blacks held official posts were cited as examples of
the corruption of such bi-racial bodies. 278 Descriptions of the “war
between the states” and Reconstruction were refurbished for the benefit of
the next generation as though the events had just occurred and could
provide a lens for viewing the present.279 The Ku Klux Klan was
romantically presented, while Blacks were accused of arrogance,
impertinence, criminality, and incompetence. 280
Those invoking the vanquished beauty of the “Old South,” who would
have found it abhorrent to use kidnapped people as perpetual unpaid labor
if the laborers had been White, were comfortable with the former tradition
of owning African-American slaves. The lost Confederacy they envisioned
was a serene, well-ordered society of gentlemen, a democratic White polity
whose institutions were approved by the law, the church, and the press.281

274. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 79. Austria lost areas inhabited by 3.5 million Germanspeaking Austrians. Id.
275. Id. at 80, 318.
276. Id. at 5; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
277. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 106; WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 85.
278. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 85.
279. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 85-86.
280. Id. at 76, 86.
281. Id. at 5.
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3.

The Downward Trajectory to Segregation

In the twelve years after the Treaty of Saint Germain had set out the
terms for Austria’s new incarnation as a Republic, rage over these terms
increased.
Polemicists claimed that Austria was saddled with a
Constitution that specifically protected the very minority whose
machinations were controlling the country. 282 The University of Vienna
must guard the German Student Body from pollution by officially
segregating it from Jewish students. Frustration of this purpose would
signal a final defeat for the majority group. The German-Austrian Daily
News demanded: “Are we Germans still the decision-making masters in
our own country, or are we now nothing more than tolerated guests, fair
game for a handful of foreigners . . ..?” 283
In a similar span of years after the Confederacy’s surrender to Union
forces, White supremacists complained that they were oppressed by
“Yankee and Negro rule.” 284 Yet, observers from both races described
“freedom of association between whites and blacks . . . frequency and
intimacy of personal contact, and . . . Negro participation in political
affairs” in various parts of the South, as well as rising fury culminating in
lynching and fanatical assertions of racism. 285 Professor Vann Woodward
reminded us that at this point, “There were real choices to be made, and
alternatives to the course eventually pursued with such single-minded
unanimity and unquestioning conformity were still available.”286
These two post-war periods in Austria and the American South indicate
some intriguing parallels in the majority group’s sense that defeat had
opened the door for outsiders to change the rules of the game. As a result
of this humiliating interference, the majority was now under siege by the
“Other” and must act politically to terminate that threat. A difference,
which will be discussed further below, was the judiciary’s response. In
Austria the Constitutional Court’s rescission of the Nazi Student Orders
postponed the onset of segregation for years, while in America the High
Court’s choice was to join the changing national mood elevating federalism
over minority rights. Federal troops departed from the South in 1877, and
the North (whose own record on race relations was hardly sterling) tilted
towards sectional reconciliation.287

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

PAULEY, supra note 2, at 79-80.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM J. COOPER, JR., JEFFERSON DAVIS, AMERICAN 602 (2000).
WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 35-44.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 6, 70-71.
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The United States Supreme Court had curtailed the Privileges and
Immunities Clause in the Slaughter House Cases 288 and its successors,289
and then held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress
to bar individuals from engaging in discriminatory conduct; 290 determined
that a state could mandate segregation on a common carrier;291 concluded
in Plessy v. Ferguson that segregation was constitutional if based on a
“separate but equal” system; 292 and validated Mississippi’s plan for
depriving Blacks of the right to vote. 293
Segregation laws freed of judicial restriction began to proliferate in the
twentieth century, embodied in local regulations, city ordinances, and
statutes. 294 In various patterns that appeared, Blacks were separated from
Whites in employment, in theaters and movie houses, street cars, trains,
buses, parks, and schools. 295 Residence for Blacks could be restricted to
certain areas by law, by threats, or by economics. 296 In some cities,
curfews forbade them to go out after 10 p.m. 297 Mobs robbed, assaulted,
and murdered them. 298 In the words of Professor Woodward,
The Jim Crow laws put the authority of the state or city in the voice of the
street-car conductor, the railway brakeman, the bus driver, the theater
usher, and also into the voice of the hoodlum . . . . They gave free rein
and the majesty of the law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have
been curbed, blunted or deflected. 299

And so it was also in Austria. After the Anschluss, segregation of Jews
in employment and provision of professional services was put into place;300
residential separation was facilitated by confiscating homes and
terminating leases, forcing Jews into a few areas where large numbers lived
in a few rooms. 301 Jews were segregated and ultimately excluded from
schools, parks, movie theaters, sports stadiums, barber shops, and train

288. See generally 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
289. See generally United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); U.S. v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875).
290. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
291. Louisville, New Orleans & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Mississippi, 133 U.S. 587, 592 (1890).
292. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
293. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225 (1898).
294. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 98-99, 106.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 100-01.
297. Id. at 101.
298. Id. at 86-87.
299. Id. at 107-08.
300. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 282-83, 285-86, 290.
301. Id. at 288-89.
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cars. 302 Curfews were imposed. 303 Bands of roving thugs, often joined by
the SA, looted, tortured, and murdered Jews, especially in Vienna.304 By
1941, any possibility of anonymity was removed; although Jews could not
generally be identified by skin color, any Jew over the age of six had to
wear the clearly visible Star of David.305
4.

Significant Differences in Context Between Austrian and Southern
Domination

Before comparison of the Austrian Constitutional Court’s decision with
the United States Supreme Court’s rulings in Brown and its predecessors,
some distinctions in political context must be set out. These distinctions
are important and intertwined with each other.
Under the Habsburg Monarchy, Austrian Jews had generally enjoyed
constitutional equality, respect, and protection that enabled them to interact
with modern society and to make substantial contributions to Austrian
culture. 306 This golden age was ended when the murder of the heir to the
Austro-Hungarian throne in 1914 led to four years of war and economic
disaster that fueled an upsurge of Austrian anti-Semitism. 307 In the next
two decades, poorer Jews––who were probably the bulk of the Austrian
Jewish population––worked as tailors, peddlers, and newspaper salesmen.
Many were immigrants from the former eastern provinces of the Empire,
and were described in pan-German propaganda as foreign parasites.308
Competition between Jews and Christians tended to occur at the next
level, that of middle-class merchants and professionals. 309 Jews had
difficulty finding jobs with Gentile employers, and gravitated towards
starting their own businesses, or joining professions such as architecture,
law, and medicine.310 If they were successful, they were often accused of
rising through unfair use of influence rather than through merit.311
When Nazi power increased, it was popular and profitable to eliminate
these unneeded competitors. Although Jewish businesses employed
Christians, the entire enterprise could simply be “Aryanized” and the

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. at 284, 291.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 11, 22-23.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 80, 178, 212, 216.
Id. at 200-02.
Id. at 213.
See supra Part I.F.2.
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owners given a token payment or none at all.312 In 1938, all Jewish actors,
musicians, journalists, and employees of banks and insurance companies
were dismissed. 313
By contrast, Blacks emerging from slavery in America were competing
largely with lower-income Whites. 314 Employers used African-Americans
as strike-breakers, service workers, and servants. 315 Landowners used
them as share-croppers. 316 They were cheap labor, and necessary to the
viability of the South. Suffering from the lingering effects of slave status
in their speech and manner, they were derided as innately inferior and
therefore unfit for full participation in White civilization. 317
These differences in the strata of job competition are relevant to the most
stark distinction between Austrian Nazi and Jim Crow domination. In
Austria, the “final solution” that followed segregation was to drive out,
intern, and ultimately kill the minority group. 318 Emigration after
surrendering every asset was legally permitted until 1941, yet even before
that time transports to work and death camps had begun. In the American
South, the “final settlement” in the early Twentieth Century was
segregation, accompanied by lynching and threats to those who did not
“stay ‘in their place.’”319 Neither of these outcomes could ever have
occurred without prior demonization of the other as a bearer of pollution
that could destroy a beautified traditional society. The economic element
must be recognized, however. Austria’s Nazis were enriched by expulsion
of Jews, the South’s Whites by expulsion of “Carpetbaggers” and
establishment of a new kind of servitude for Blacks.
B.

Brown and Judicial Choices

Proponents of “separate but equal” in Austria and America favored
similar tests relying on formula instead of fact. The University of Vienna’s
Academic Senate proclaimed that its Student Nations each had “the same
rights.” The German Student Body had the right to exclude those it
categorized as Jewish; presumably, the Jewish Student Body could reject

312. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 283.
313. Id. at 282-83.
314. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 86.
315. Id. at 86-87.
316. Id. at 93.
317. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 32, 76.
318. PAULEY, supra note 2, at 294-98.
319. FREDRICKSON, supra note 14, at 93. Note also that for Jews, the greatest period of
oppression came after segregation, while the greatest oppression for Blacks––slavery––
occurred before Jim Crow; WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 7.
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any Gentile who applied. Each group could elect a representative. Thus,
mandatory separation did not constitute inequality. That brand of logic
surfaced in the United States Supreme Court’s Plessy v. Ferguson320
decision upholding Louisiana’s authority to segregate railway carriages and
noting that no race was more disadvantaged than the other. Blacks were
excluded from “White” railway cars and Whites from “Black” cars.
When this equal-exclusion claim was considered in the context of higher
education, the Court balked. Petitioner in Sweatt v. Painter 321 was denied
admission to the state-supported University of Texas Law School because
he was Black, but was given the “opportunity” (which he rejected) to enroll
in a separate law school that had just been created by the State for Blacks.
The unanimous bench assessed not only the tangible qualities of the two
schools (the newer one was somewhat upgraded after the trial stage in the
lawsuit), but also the intangible qualities: “It may be argued that excluding
petitioner from . . . [Texas Law School] is no different from excluding
white students from the new law school. This contention overlooks
realities.” 322 It would be highly unlikely that a majority group member
attending a school with “rich traditions and prestige” would complain that
he was deprived of the chance to enroll at the Black school. 323 Applying
these realities to Austria’s segregated student groups, “equal rights” could
not be demonstrated merely by providing each student with a ticket to some
entity labeled a Nation.
Moving to a situation of intra-school segregation that presents some
parallels to the Nazi Student Orders at the University of Vienna, appellant
in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education 324 was a
Black student with a Master’s Degree in Education who applied to
Oklahoma University in order to study for a doctorate. He was denied

320. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896). “Separate but equal” was perceived as a tangible
deprivation by Black students who were subjected to it. In one case, a seven-year-old third
grader, who lived only a few blocks from the local Whites-only school, had to walk six
blocks through dangerous railroad switching yards, then cross the area’s busiest commercial
street to reach a school bus pick-up point to get to an all-Black school. If the school was
not yet open when the bus arrived, she waited in all weathers. The area was Topeka,
Kansas, and the child was Linda Brown, the oldest of the five Brown plaintiffs. KLUGER,
supra note 56, at 409-10. For detailed descriptions of disparities in facilities, see id. at 1314, 302, 388-89.
321. 339 U.S. 629, 631-32 (1950).
322. Id. at 634.
323. Id. Petitioner’s right to attend Texas Law School was upheld, though his request
that Plessy be re-examined was not. Id. at 634-36.
324. 339 U.S. 637, 638 (1950). The case was argued by Robert L. Carter and Amos T.
Hall, counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(“NAACP”). Id. at 637.
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admission because of his race, then (after filing a federal suit) admitted but
compelled to sit in an anteroom adjoining the classroom, use only a
designated mezzanine desk in the library, and eat only at a different time
from other students in the cafeteria. 325 As the case progressed to the
Supreme Court, these conditions were altered to the extent that McLaurin
now sat in the regular classroom but in a separate designated row, and ate
at the same time in the cafeteria as White students but at an assigned
separate table. The University argued that these were nominal restrictions,
and that he was permitted to wait in the same cafeteria line and talk with
Whites as he did so. 326
These opportunities for in-line chats did not impress the Supreme Court.
Setting McLaurin apart from majority-group students would “impair and
inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views”
with classmates. 327 Perhaps removal of legal restrictions would still not
induce these classmates to talk to him. Nevertheless “[t]here is a vast
difference – a Constitutional difference – between restrictions imposed by
the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, and the
refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no such
bar.” 328
We do not have evidence about whether the Student Nations in Austria
were compelled to sit apart in lunchrooms. The impact of the mandated
separation was on the exercise of intra-school political rights. Jewish
students excluded from the German Student Body were thereby also
excluded from assisting in “discipline” and keeping order; voting in critical
student elections; using special faculty spaces for meetings; helping to set
policy on such issues as ceilings on the number of Jews to be admitted to
the University. 329 These disabilities would affect opportunities for the
“intellectual commingling” that was at the center of McLaurin’s concerns.
Members of the German Student Body did not consider their individual
power to impose social ostracism to be nearly sufficient; the segregation
had to be State-imposed in order to consolidate their political goals. One of
these was the need to stigmatize.
The United States Supreme Court finally grappled with the issue of

325. Id. at 638-40.
326. Id. at 640-41.
327. Id. at 641.
328. Id.
329. Hearing, supra note 2, at 3. Assistance with “discipline” would allow members of
the German Student Body to punish those who were charged with disobeying rules (or to
refrain from doing so); GULICK, supra note 63, at 639-41.
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stigma in Brown, 330 using it as one of the predicates for the holding that
“separate but equal” is unconstitutional in the field of public education.
Cases coming from the states of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware were consolidated because the plaintiffs in each had been
excluded from schools attended by White children under laws requiring or
permitting racial segregation. 331 The arguments on behalf of the plaintiffs
were presented by National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) counsel, pursuant to an evolving strategy described in
riveting detail by historian Richard Kluger. 332 The Brown opinion
underscored its theme by citing with approval a pre-Plessy statement in
Strauder v. West Virginia, a case involving an attempt to preclude Blacks
from serving on juries: “[Due process of law includes] the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored, . . . implying inferiority in civil society, . . . which are steps toward
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.”333
This quote stressed the discriminatory purpose of the legislation, an
approach that is highly relevant to the Nazi Student Orders. The Orders
were designed to be the first step in legalizing all forms of segregation in
Austria. Brown’s principal emphasis, however, was not on legislative
intent but instead on the impact of segregation, which deprived minoritygroup children in public schools of equal educational opportunity.
Rejecting Plessy’s assertion that mandatory separation of the races was
only offensive if Blacks decided to interpret it that way, the Justices
concluded that segregating Black children in elementary and high schools
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community” that
is unlikely to be reversed. 334 The social science data underlying this
finding were picked apart from many political perspectives in subsequent
years. 335 The difficulty of making such judicial choices can be seen in the

330. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
331. Id. at 486.
332. KLUGER, supra note 56, at 509-81. Robert L. Carter argued for plaintiffs in the
Brown case from Kansas; Thurgood Marshall represented plaintiffs in the companion case,
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), from South Carolina. An associate of
the two advocates described Carter as “the keel” and Marshall as “the wind.” KLUGER,
supra note 56, at 272.
333. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492 n.5 (quoting approvingly from Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880)).
334. Id. at 494.
335. See, e.g., CHARLES OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, REFLECTIONS ON THE
FIRST FALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 302 (2004). Professor Ogletree
notes:
The challenge of Brown was not only to achieve integration but also to recognize
that once integrated, all of us are diverse: we have all given up something to gain
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painful deliberations and “unanimous” opinions of the Austrian
Constitutional Court and the United States Supreme Court. Some issues
were ignored and others bolstered, while the Justices kept a close eye on
public opinion and calculated the costs of each stand they took.
1.
a)

Judicial Independence

The Constitutional Court and External Pressures

In response to the Austrian Constitutional Court’s nullification of
University segregation, the pan-German press proclaimed that “courts . . .
are not independent arbitrary plantations, self-sufficient and detached from
the people, who can simply turn their eyes away from the people and the
government who appoint them, can simply ignore their mission and
implement traitorous policies, and an ‘administration of justice’ that are
inimical to the people.” 336
Rather than returning the case to the court below, the Justices had
undertaken the responsibility and used the Associations Law as a predicate
for rescission of the Nazi Student Orders. That left no controversy about
remedy; the German Student Body no longer had the imprimatur of law to
continue in existence. It was foreseeable that this choice would result in an
escalation of violence––pressure that the Justices did not acknowledge,

something more. Integration does not simply place people side by side in various
institutional settings; rather, it remakes America, creating a new community
founded on a new form of respect and tolerance. Implicit in that challenge was
the recognition that white society had to change to acknowledge in substantive
ways the achievements of African-American society. It was not enough simply to
admit African-Americans to the table, or even to let them dine, but to partake of
the food they brought with them.
Id. at 295; see generally DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF
INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004);
PETER IRONS, JIM CROW’S CHILDREN, THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN DECISION
(2002); JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE
AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001); Joseph D. Silbey, Race Judicata, SOC. SCI. RES.
NETWORK
ELECTRONIC
LIBR.,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=531283.
The question of whether bias would affect any group that was its object was pursued
by counsel for defendants in one of the consolidated Brown cases emanating from Virginia.
Dr. Isador Chein, a Jewish expert witness for plaintiffs who was bluntly asked whether
discrimination made him feel inferior, explained that when the government of a state or
country endorses the inferiority of a group on the basis of skin color or religion, its members
tend to internalize that view. KLUGER, supra note 56, at 494.
336. See supra note 9. The article noted that such dangerous illusions of independence
must be dispelled, by “brutality” if necessary.
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even in their deliberations. Nazi electoral victories in Germany posed an
increasing external threat to Austria’s independence, and strengthened the
determination of Austrian Nazis to achieve their segregationist goals by
terrorizing their opponents. The Constitutional Court’s action prevented
the fruition of these goals until the Anschluss.
b)

The Supreme Court and Regional Resistance

The American Justices were less restrained in expressing their fear that
defiance and violence would follow a desegregation decree. Professor
Mark Tushnet, Richard Kluger, and other historians have provided insights
into the Brown I deliberations and the subsequent conferences about
remedy in Brown II. Like Court President Durig in Vienna, Chief Justice
Earl Warren had a crucial impact on the Supreme Court’s direction. He did
not make accusations against Southern segregationists which would have
antagonized two of his colleagues, but instead commented only that
“segregation was no longer justifiable in this day and age.” 337
Justice Frankfurter, an apostle of judicial restraint but nonetheless
committed to overruling Plessy, reminded the Justices of the political
implications of failing to do so. 338 The administration of President Harry
S. Truman had opposed the caste system, and had already urged the
Justices in 1950, in the prior Henderson case, to overrule the “separate but
equal” doctrine. 339 In addition, there were international repercussions. The
Department of Justice’s amicus brief in the restrictive covenant cases had
stated that racial segregation hampered the United States in foreign
relations, especially in competition with the Soviet Union for the favor of
African nations.
President Truman had taken a number of prior steps to implement racial
justice. In 1946, he established a Commission on Higher Education, which
concluded that segregation legislation must be repealed. 340 Integration of
American troops pursuant to Truman’s executive order of July 26, 1948,
was eventually implemented, governing soldiers serving abroad in Austria
and Germany and at home in army, navy, and air force bases in Georgia,
the Carolinas, Virginia, Alabama, and Texas. 341
Although the executive branch had advocated desegregation, the impact
337. See Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened In Brown v. Board of
Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1877 (1991) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER
CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT ––A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 95 (1985)).
338. Id. at 1908-09.
339. Id. at 1885-87.
340. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 135.
341. Id. at 137-39.
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of such a decree on southern sensibilities troubled some of the Justices.
Professor Tushnet described a draft opinion by Jackson stating that the
Court could not discount the claims of Whites who sincerely believed that
“their blood, lineage and culture are worthy of protection by enforced
separatism of races.” 342 Their feelings had been reinforced by the
humiliation of “carpetbag government imposed by conquest” and
Justice Black predicted that
resentment of the Reconstruction. 343
overruling Plessy would engender resistance and violence. Nonetheless,
because segregation established an unconstitutional caste system, the Court
must strike it down knowing that this “means trouble.” 344
And trouble came. Four states displayed open resistance by imposing
penalties for compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision.345 There was
violence even at the university level, where the Justices had expected less
difficulty because the numbers of African-Americans admitted would be
smaller. 346 A riot broke out at the University of Alabama over the
admission of Autherine Lucy, and mobs threatened her as she attended
In Mississippi, Governor Ross Barnett announced that
classes. 347
integration was unconstitutional, and that any federal officials seeking to
implement it would be arrested.348 Three hundred and twenty federal
marshals entered the University of Mississippi at Oxford in 1962 to protect
James Meredith, an African-American native of the state whose admission
to the school had been ordered by Justice Black. 349 The marshals were
dispatched by President John F. Kennedy, who had from the start of his
administration proclaimed that Brown was “legally and morally right.”350
His televised appeal for reason, urging that “the honor of your university
and the state are in the balance” was unavailing. 351 Armed mobs attacked
342. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 337, at 1915.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1904-05.
345. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 157.
346. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 337, at 1903.
347. WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 163. Autherine Lucy was suspended, reinstated by
court order, and then immediately expelled for making “outrageous” charges against the
University trustees. The University of Alabama remained segregated for seven more years.
Id. President Dwight D. Eisenhower took no action in this instance. Id. But the President
subsequently sent federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas to protect nine Black children who
had been prevented from entering an all-White high school by Governor Orval E. Faubus’s
national guard and threatened by huge mobs. Id. at 166.
348. Id. at 174.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 172.
351. Id. at 174. As of 2002, African-American students comprised 13% of the enrollment
at the University, and have held every major leadership post there. David M. Halbfinger, 40
Years After Infamy, Ole Miss Looks to Reflect and Heal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2002, at A1.
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the marshals with gasoline bombs, bricks, and firearms; the marshals
augmented by army troops fought back with tear gas, and there were
numerous injuries and two deaths. For the next year, three hundred
national troops stayed on hand to keep order.
These riots are reminiscent of the violence at the University of Vienna:
the majority had an obsessive conviction that desegregation would “befoul”
society, and implemented that conviction through brutality. Yet the
situations also differed in significant respects. Austria’s universities had
been integrated prior to the promulgation of the Nazi Student Orders, and
continuation of the Orders would have precipitated a downward trajectory
fueled by an external enemy. Dis-integration was halted only by the
judiciary, while the federal administration under Chancellor Buresch did
not authorize police protection and unsuccessfully attempted to reestablish
segregation through legislation. The judiciary’s task was completed in one
decision based on statute that encompassed an immediate remedy––
rescission of the German Student Body’s official separatist legitimation.
In America, the upward trajectory based on a general constitutional
command was contorted by the Brown II question of whether the remedy of
prompt desegregation or a more gradual “deliberate speed” should be
decreed. Black and Douglas, the “libertarians,” favored a clear statement
of unconstitutionality coupled with granting prompt relief to the named
plaintiffs only. 352 The gradualist solution was adopted, however, because
its proponents feared that greater displays of federal judicial muscle would
have provoked more widespread Southern resistance, and involved the
courts in too much micro-managing.
Operating in our common law framework that contemplates judge-made
law to interpret the Constitution and may shade into “judicial activism,” the
Justices produced a historic departure from precedent in Brown I, but then
applied the brakes of judicial restraint with a heavy foot in Brown II.
Ironically, the failure of the gradualist remedy to appease segregationists
eventually necessitated a wider expansion of the federal judicial power than
might have resulted from the quicker solution proposed by the civil
libertarians. 353
2.

Challenges to Brown’s Predicates and Primacy

Austrian legal academics generally maintained a silence about the
validity of the Nazi Student Orders, with the exception of Dr. Joseph
Hupka who had dissected them in the public press and found them to be
352. Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 337, at 1930.
353. Id.
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unlawful. 354 After the High Court’s opinion was issued, constitutional law
scholars merely summarized it or cited it largely in the context of
discussing the formal requirements of Associations Law. 355 By contrast,
American law professors were not reticent about critiquing the legal
underpinnings, assumptions, and consequences of the Brown decision.
Professor Herbert Wechsler’s “Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law” counseled that where the combination of constitutional
phrases, history and precedent do not yield a clear answer in an
adjudication, standards must be found that transcend the case at hand.356
From this unremarkable proposition, he went on to criticize the Supreme
Court for failing to explain its later extension of the school desegregation
decision to other facilities such as public transportation, which people are
not obligated to use. 357 Perhaps this was simply a way of stating that
avoiding extensive analysis of a legal proposition for political reasons (the
Justices did want to keep Brown short) is unacceptable. Wechsler lost the
high ground of reasonable generality, however, when he implied that the
motive of the legislature should not be an object of inquiry and gave some
credence to Plessy’s statement that racial separation is a badge of
inferiority for Blacks “solely” because they “choose to put that construction
upon it.” 358 Professor Charles Black responded that the Court should be
able to learn and use knowledge about the caste system’s purpose that is
“obvious to everybody else and to the Justices as individuals,” 359 and
Professor (now Judge) Louis Pollak noted that Wechsler’s own criteria for
“neutral” decision-making remained vague. 360 Judge Richard Posner, in
turn, commented that Wechsler’s unexplained reference to neutral
principles may mean that judges should not premise their decisions on
grounds that would “require them to engage with the messy world of
empirical reality . . . .” 361
Support for Brown’s equal protection holding, though not its
sociological references, was developed by Professor Michael McConnell,
who concluded after a comprehensive review of the legislative history that

354. See supra note 249.
355. See, e.g., Merkl, supra note 197.
356. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15, 19 (1959).
357. Id. at 22.
358. Id. at 33.
359. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 427 (1960).
360. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 PENN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959).
361. Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 33 (1993).
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the Fourteenth Amendment forbids assignment of students to separate
schools or classes on the basis of race. 362 Alexander Bickel’s take on that
legislative history as inconclusive 363 did not go far enough; originalist
analysis demonstrates that Plessy was wrongly decided, not Brown. 364
In a spirited exchange of views with McConnell, the primacy of Brown
was challenged by Professor Michael Klarman. 365 He offered the
provocative statement that Brown was “unnecessary from the perspective
of long-term racial change” because traditional southern attitudes were
already being altered by factors including Cold War imperatives, the
increasing clout of northern Blacks, and the growing social integration of a
nation linked by interstate travel and television.366 Yet Klarman proceeded
to compliment Brown on its unintended consequences—fueling southern
resistance in the form of officially-sanctioned violence against peaceful
demonstrators, which captured the attention and civil rights sympathies of
the North. 367 The ugliness of these confrontations speeded the enactment
of vital civil rights provisions.
A recent assessment by Professor James Patterson addressed in detail the
entrenched phenomenon of de facto segregation and re-segregation, and the
skepticism of critical race theorists about the goal of integration.368
Nonetheless, he concluded that Brown was of “incalculable” value because
ideals of justice and equality were reconsecrated.369 As Richard Kluger
observed in his monumental work Simple Justice: “The decision marked
the turning point in America’s willingness to face the consequences of
centuries of racial discrimination, a practice tracing back nearly to the First
Settlement of the New World.” 370 Then Jim Crow died in 1965, with the
362. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REV. 947, 949-55 (1995).
363. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 56-60 (1955); cf. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism
in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 938-40 (1986)
(concluding after a persuasive analysis of legislative history that the framers of the
fourteenth amendment conferred upon Congress and the federal courts the primary authority
to enforce individual civil rights).
364. McConnell, supra note 362.
365. See generally Klarman, supra note 260.
366. Id. at 14.
367. Id. at 76.
368. See PATTERSON, supra note 335; see also Ogletree, supra note 335.
369. PATTERSON, supra note 335, at 222.
370. See KLUGER, supra note 56, at iii. Thurgood Marshall, an NAACP advocate in the
Brown consolidated cases, was appointed as the United States Supreme Court’s first Black
justice in 1967. Id. at 760. For an analysis of Justice Marshall’s efforts to implement
Brown, see Maria L. Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall’s Desegregation
Opinions, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 69 (1992).
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passage of the federal Voting Rights Act capping a year of comprehensive
legislation championed by President Lyndon B. Johnson. 371
This transformation of racial attitudes embodied in Brown was affected
by post-war revulsion against Hitler’s policies of racial separation and
brutality in Europe. 372 Racism was in bad odor, and associated with the
enemy that America had defeated. Southerners saw no analogy, however,
and resented the efforts of Nazi propagandists to prop up their ideology by
referring to Jim Crow laws. 373
III.
We study history, among other reasons, to learn from its successes as
well as its mistakes. The Austrian judiciary’s decision to rescind the Nazi
Student Orders in 1931 responded to the same call for decency, equality,
and full citizenship as Brown v. Board of Education did in 1954. The same
currents of minority rights within majority tides swirl through both
opinions. The consequences attendant on prohibitions against cultural
diversity are evident, 374 and provide a lesson forward on the question of
which doctrines should control when universities seek to avoid
entanglement with associations that exclude Blacks.
A.

State Intervention vs. State Neutrality

Associations law in 1930’s Austria was premised on assumptions that
sharply differ from those of contemporary America. Formation of citizen
groups had been permitted as a matter of grace by Emperor Franz Joseph in
1867. This paternalistic largesse was accompanied by a high degree of
police control, particularly of political groups that might become
troublesome to the monarchy. Although the right to form associations was
subsequently established as fundamental and the registration procedures
371. See WOODWARD, supra note 169, at 188-90.
372. See Klarman, supra note 260, at 25-26.
373. See Johnpeter H. Grill & Robert L. Jenkins, The Nazis and the American South in
the 1930’s: A Mirror Image?, 58 J. S. HIST. 667-68, 675-76, 684-88, 993 (1992); see also
supra note 174 and accompanying text.
374. See Council of the European Union Directive, Arts. 2, 3, and 5, prohibiting
discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, and permitting member states to compensate
for disadvantages linked to such origin. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. L 180.
See Arie Farnam, Defying EU Pressure, Slovokia is Systematically Segregating Its Romany
Minority Into Ghettos, and Barring Their Entrance Into Cities, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Jan. 3, 2003 at 4; supra Part I.H.1; cf. Mark Landler, Rare Bosnia Success Story,
Thanks to U.S. Viceroy, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003, at A3 (describing friendships between
Muslims, Croats and Serbs in an integrated Bosnian high school).
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applicable to associations were modified, the potential for full supervision
remained in force. 375
The emphasis was not on government neutrality, but rather on the
organization’s adherence to the rules. Thus, associations law could be used
by the Constitutional Court to disband the “Nations” because they were
unauthorized. 376 Political control over associations could also be used by
the Dollfuss administration, however, to prevent the emergence of certain
voluntary and peaceful groups while relentlessly “encouraging” citizens to
join its own favored organization, the Fatherland Front. 377
American associations law, by contrast, has adhered to the principle that
government must remain content and viewpoint neutral when it interacts
with private entities. 378 This principle necessarily involves some loss of
control over racist groups, and some tension with anti-discrimination law.
Yet the Austrian experience demonstrates that permitting executive
officials to retain broad powers over all associations is a problematic
method of suppressing racism. As some of the Austrian Justices well
understood, implementation of constitutional restrictions on the authority of
a public university to accommodate or dismantle associations was also
needed in crafting a long-term solution.
Has American law made appropriate calibrations in developing such
restrictions? Although the university setting is by tradition a center of
intellectual and philosophical thought and experiment, racism has remained
a stubborn reality. One out of four minority college students are victims of
hate crimes or bias-driven threats or slurs every year. 379 Universities with
segregated student bodies continue to exist in America––Bob Jones has
received more than fifteen minutes of fame. 380 And at the high school
375. See supra Part I.G.2.b.
376. See supra Part I.B.2.
377. See supra Part I G.2.b.
378. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (ruling that the University’s refusal to pay a third-party
contractor for the printing costs of petitioners’ student publications containing religious
articles was not supported by Establishment Clause concerns). In his dissent, Justice Souter
noted that “the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose of the
Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate. Other
things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one message
while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond.” Id. at
894; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-70 (1981) (disallowing state university
that routinely provided facilities for meetings of registered students from barring student
religious speech). The Supreme Court noted that where a state has chosen to offer a forum
to citizens, exclusions “bear a heavy burden of justification.” Id. at 268.
379. Issues in Diversity Prejudice and Ethnoviolence On Campus 6, HIGHER EDUC.
EXTENSION SERVICE REV., No. 2 (Winter 1995) [hereinafter IssuesI].
380. See infra notes 392, 402-08.
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level, a Nazi organization has demanded the use of public school facilities
for its activities, resulting in a split circuit court ruling approving the
request. 381
The following hypothetical will illustrate the tension between First and
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Assume that a public university in
New York State generally provides large conference rooms for outside
organizations which fill out a form describing their group and the activities
planned for the desired space. In my example, a request for such space has
been made by a club from the local town called White World, which
excludes all Blacks. Some students on campus have protested against the
granting of the request because of the group’s White supremacist website.
The club’s attorney has therefore taken the precaution of attaching a letter
to the request form, explaining that the University would be in violation of
law if rooms for its conference series were denied. The letter is passed on
to the University’s counsel.
The club’s lawyer describes White World as “an exclusively political
association, with a clearly defined purpose: to reestablish White dominance
in all public and private spheres, and to confine Blacks to the positions that
reflect their innate inferiority.” He notes that the First Amendment accords
the freedom to associate with others for political ends and shields all-White
organizations from governmental intrusion if their expressive purposes
could not be promoted “nearly as effectively” without rejection of those
who do not share the same racial characteristics.382 The connection
between White World’s aims and its exclusion of Blacks is far more
381. See Nat’l Socialist White People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1012 (4th Cir.
1973) (en banc). The White supremacist group which initiated the suit was a successor to
the American Nazi Party. Id.
382. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). New York
City amended its Human Rights Law, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986), which had
previously exempted clubs that were “distinctly private in nature,” establishing in this
amendment that clubs with more than 400 members, regularly providing meals and
receiving non-member payments for the furtherance of business shall not be deemed
“distinctly private.” Id. at 5-6. In response to a suit by a consortium of 125 private clubs,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision, finding no evidence that
associational rights were significantly affected. The Court noted, however, that it was
“conceivable” that an association “organized for specific expressive purposes . . . will not be
able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its
membership to those who share the same sex . . .” Id. at 13; see also concurring opinion of
Justice O’Connor, suggesting protection for the associational rights of organizations “whose
expressive purposes would be substantially undermined” unless they could exclude those of
a different race. Id. at 19; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963) (expanding
on freedom of association). The word “association” does not appear in the Constitution but
is nevertheless rooted in rights to petition the government for redress of grievances, to speak
freely, and to assemble. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984),
discussed infra notes 410-417 and in accompanying text.
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evident than the link found sufficient in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale383
between the Scouts’ purposes and rejection of gays. White World is at
present a rather small group qualifying as an intimate association with no
business component, rather than a large and unselective place of public
accommodation that could be reached by anti-discrimination laws. Its
conferences, however, are open to all, and the club expects many young
people to attend.
University counsel writes in response that although she agrees that the
school cannot interfere with the club’s membership policies or restrict its
speech rights, she is not convinced that the organization’s invidious private
bias must be given affirmative constitutional protection. If the University
engages in the affirmative act of giving the organization the convenience
and respectability of its facilities, which are designated for “desirable
public purposes,” it might be going beyond what the Constitution requires
and furthering the club’s agenda. 384 Courts have found anti-discrimination
policy at both national and state levels to be a compelling governmental
interest that may in some contexts overcome competing First Amendment
claims. The University’s individualized admissions policy allowing a
modest and flexible “plus factor” for Blacks in order to maintain racial
diversity is also a compelling interest, one which would be incompatible
with accommodating this organization’s conferences.385
B.

Equal Treatment vs. Associational Freedom

Brown placed the plaintiffs’ right to equality above the desire of Whites
not to associate with them (a position that did not escape Herbert
383. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644-45 (2000), where the membership
of an assistant scoutmaster with an “exemplary” record was revoked after he identified
himself as gay in a newspaper interview. Dale sued the Boy Scouts in the New Jersey
courts, alleging a violation of the State’s public accommodations law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 645. The Supreme Court held that
an association does not have to “associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain
message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.” Id. at 655. It
was sufficient that the Boy Scouts believed that “homosexual conduct is inconsistent with
the values it seeks to instill in its youth members . . . .” Id. at 654. For commentary on the
majority opinion, see Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law
After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1515 (2001); Evelyn Brody, Entrance,
Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of Association, 35 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 821, 848 (2002).
384. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819,
893 n.12 (1985) (Souter, J., dissenting), where the Supreme Court concluded that when a
university creates a limited public forum, speech distinctions based on subject matter are
permissible if these distinctions are “’reasonable in light of the purposes served by the
forum.’” (Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
385. See infra Part III.C.
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Wechsler’s doubting eye). The Justices conceived of the Equal Protection
Clause as, inter alia, a prohibition against the hierarchy that would confine
African-Americans to being “a subject race.”386 Although “Black” and
“White” identities in America have been constructed and expressed in a
wide variety of social settings, 387 the racial hierarchy enforced by legal
measures such as the slave laws, Black Codes, and Jim Crow strictures
have made these identities continue to appear more “natural” and
“primordial.” 388 Professor Rogers M. Smith has observed that this legallybolstered stratification not only injured Blacks but also Whites who “were
tempted into investing deeply in racial lies and in oppressive arrangements
that bred ongoing civil strife.” 389
Overcoming such barriers to equality can be viewed as an element of
liberty. As Professor Cass Sunstein has suggested,
libertarians, who may appear to oppose equality, insist on equality of an
important kind; they want to ensure that all citizens have an equal right to
pursue their own ends. An understanding of equality lies at the heart of
the libertarian creed. Freedom from desperate conditions, often treated as
an egalitarian idea, is an understanding of liberty as well. Those who
emphasize autonomy in the formation of preferences are speaking of both
equality and liberty; they want to ensure that unjustified inequalities––
inequalities based upon . . . race, or sex, for example––do not limit the
free development of individual personality. 390

The University would invoke two Supreme Court decisions, Runyon v.
McCrary 391 and Bob Jones University v. United States, 392 to support its

386. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 490 n.5 (1954); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2435-36 (1994) [hereinafter Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle]; Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 107, 150-56 (1976).
387. See e.g., K. Anthony Appiah, Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections,
in COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 30-38 (1996); J. M. Balkin, The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2360 (1997); Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social
Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 58 (1994).
388. Rogers M. Smith, “Black” and “White” in Brown: Equal Protection and the Legal
Construction of Racial Identities, at 11 (2003), at http://bepress.com/ils/iss2/art16 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2004).
389. Id. at 13.
390. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, supra note 386, at 2411. Sunstein explores the
“alleged” opposition between equality and liberty, noting that the term “liberty” could refer
to fundamental political rights such as free speech, but also to a system that would enhance
autonomy in the development of personal beliefs by providing an adequate education to
everyone and by countering unfair background conditions. Id. at 2410, 2420.
391. 427 U.S. 160 (1976); see infra notes 393-97 and accompanying text.
392. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see also infra notes 402-09 and accompanying text.
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argument that government has no constitutional duty to facilitate private
bias. Both involved segregated schools but neither has been broadly
extended beyond its specific context. McCrary was issued in response to
strategies used by Southern states which had been forced to desegregate.393
Public schools were severely underfunded, while money was provided to
benefit Whites-only private schools. Black students who were denied
admission to these all-White institutions sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1991), a federal statute giving Blacks the same liberty to make and enforce
contracts as Whites.
The Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ First Amendment claims,
noting that while “private discrimination may be characterized as a form of
exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment . . . it
has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections,” quoting
from its prior statement in Norwood v. Harrison. 394 Section 1981’s
predecessor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, was passed pursuant to
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate badges
of slavery, and prohibited Whites from precluding contracts on racial
grounds. 395 Justice Stewart’s opinion for the McCrary majority indicated
that the judiciary may not enforce discriminatory contractual schemes, and
that the all-White schools must therefore extend contracts for educational
services to the respondents. 396 The Court also concluded with little
analysis that mandating the admission of these Black children to the school
need not interfere with the institution’s segregationist “ideas or dogma.”397
(Recall Bob Jones University, which both admits Blacks and enforces
segregation).
McCrary underscored the difference between government assistance to a
biased private entity and government regulation of such an entity’s
ideological expression, a point useful to the University in the White World
example. But, White World could counter that despite 1981’s grounding in
Reconstruction era purposes, its text seeks parity of treatment between the

393. See Brody, supra note 383, at 842.
394. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (citing prior decision in Norwood v.
Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973)). Norwood presented the question of whether a state
statute providing free textbooks to students at private segregated schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court opined that although private bias is not barred by the
Constitution, it cannot invoke the Constitution to get aid from the State.
395. Id. at 170 (citing the prior decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Meyer Co., 342 U.S. 409,
440 (1968)).
396. Id. at 172. Because these schools solicited White students generally, with telephone
directory yellow pages advertisements and mass mailings, they were deemed more public
than private. Id. at 173.
397. Id. at 176.
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races. If a Black applicant’s right to a school contract cannot be curtailed,
then the club’s right to enter into a contract for space rental also cannot be
denied solely because of the race of its members or its White supremacist
advocacy. The University’s provision of facilities for private uses has
created a limited public forum in which viewpoint discrimination is
presumed to be impermissible.398
Contrary to the 1930’s Austrian acceptance of official control over
private organizations, America’s neutral limited-public-forum doctrine
takes a skeptical and relativistic view of government authority to assess
such private entities. Under this doctrine, a state university has many of the
characteristics of a traditional public forum (such as a city park or street),
“at least as to its students.” 399 Each student group has its own constituency
and beliefs, which should not be ranked by public officials. And if a school
has an express policy of providing conference space for outside
organizations, viewpoint discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional
when it precludes speech on a subject that would otherwise be within the
forum’s self-designated purposes. 400 White World could also note that
under a divided Fourth Circuit ruling, a forum restriction based on a Nazi
group’s biased membership policies would be as suspect under the First
Amendment as a restriction based on the group’s speech. 401
This body of public-forum law gives no weight to government policies
prohibiting racial discrimination. In Bob Jones University v. United
States, 402 such policies were dispositive. Bob Jones provides another
instance of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to facilitate private bias, an
instance arising in the tax context. The majority held that a racially
discriminatory private school could not receive tax exempt status as a
charity under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 403 This school’s
disciplinary rules provided that expulsion awaited anyone who dated or
married “outside their own race” and anyone who encouraged such
interracial bonds. 404 The Supreme Court noted that invidious distinctions
398. See supra note 378.
399. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5, 269 (1981) (State university’s refusal to
grant student religious group access to university facilities generally available to other
student groups, held unjustifiable content-based exclusion of religious speech).
400. Id. at 266. But see supra note 384.
401. See Nat’l Socialist White People’s Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1016 (4th Cir.
1973) (en banc).
402. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
403. Id. at 604. The government interest in eradicating racial bias in education was
compelling and substantially outweighed any burden that denial of tax benefits placed on
petitioners’ exercise of their religious beliefs requiring segregation.
404. Id. at 580-81. Prior to 1971, the University entirely excluded Blacks. From 19711975, it accepted applications from Blacks married “within their race.” Id. at 580. After the
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based on “racial affiliation and association” are a form of racial
discrimination. 405
In order to qualify as a charity under the applicable tax provision, an
organization must serve a desirable public purpose and confer a public
benefit. 406 Chief Justice Burger’s majority opinion concluded that
educational institutions which purvey racial bias are not beneficial
influences and should not be encouraged by the government. 407 Citing
Brown, McCrary, numerous federal statutes, and executive orders issued by
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, Burger emphasized that the
Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) was correct in recognizing that a
private school is not charitable when it violates “established public
policy.” 408 Congress affirmatively manifested its approval of this I.R.S.
ruling when it enacted a statute denying tax-exempt status to social clubs
that practice discrimination on the basis of race or color 409—a ruling that
would apply to White World.
Bob Jones could be viewed as no more than an interpretation of terms in
a tax statute, or no less than a reaffirmation that all three branches of the
federal government have rejected neutrality towards racial discrimination.
Yet the issue of context is significant. In the context of education, the
government’s interest in eradicating institutional bias is so compelling that
it requires little discussion of opposing claims. The Constitution prohibits
public schools from segregating, and federal statute prohibits segregated
private schools from receiving tax exemptions that would essentially
require the citizenry to subsidize racism.
Public policy relating to associations such as White World, however,
juggles competing interests, each of which has been respectfully received
by the Supreme Court and by federal and state legislatures. Roberts v.
United States Jaycees 410 eloquently presented both of these interests.

Supreme Court’s McCrary decision, supra notes 393-397, the school began to permit
unmarried African-Americans to enroll, subject to the disciplinary rules that prohibited
encouraging or engaging in interracial dating or marriage. Id. Bob Jones is a
fundamentalist Christian non-profit corporation unaffiliated with any religious denomination
and attended by 5000 students from kindergarten through graduate school. Id. at 574, 580.
405. Id. at 605.
406. Id. at 591-92.
407. Id. at 595.
408. Id. at 586, 594, 598. For an illuminating article on tax expenditure concepts, see
Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 407,
447-49 (1999).
409. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 601.
410. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). For an analysis of conflicts between the mediating function of
associations and other interests, see Robert K. Vischer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:
Rethinking the Value of Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 949 (2004).
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Local chapters of the Junior Chamber of Commerce (“Jaycees”) filed
charges against their national organization, alleging that the national
office’s bylaws violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act by excluding
women from regular membership. 411 As stated in the bylaws, the Jaycees’
objectives were to assist young men to participate in civic organizations
and community affairs. 412
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion recognized that associations may
provide emotional enrichment to individuals; enhance cultural diversity;
and strengthen protection for political dissenters. 413 Nevertheless, the
constitutional protection that is warranted for such associations may not
extend to larger business enterprises that qualify as places of public
accommodation. 414 The Court emphasized that a statute prohibiting
discrimination by such enterprises addresses serious personal and societal
injuries: “deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of
equal access to public establishments,” a deprivation visited on historically
disadvantaged groups which have been arbitrarily barred from
The Roberts majority
opportunities for economic advancement.415
concluded that the Jaycees organization had neither shown that it was an
intimate association, nor demonstrated that its rights of expression would
have been so impaired by admission of women that the state’s interest in
equality would have to yield.416 It was instead a large and unselective
business group subject to the Minnesota Human Rights Act’s antidiscrimination strictures. 417
If Roberts is considered a navigational chart, White World has avoided
these shoals. It is small, selectively confined to applicants with a particular
ideology, and does no business. Ironically, its wholly racist aims could
provide further insulation from the reach of civil rights statutes because
compelled admission of Blacks would undermine its expressive message.
The University’s refusal to follow limited-public-forum neutrality with
respect to White World’s request cannot be premised on claims that the
club’s exclusivity conflicts with federal 418 or New York State 419 public
accommodations laws.

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.

Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614.
Id. at 612-13.
Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 620, 624.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 626-27.
Id. at 621, 628.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, e (2003).
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.2(a) (McKinney 2004).
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University Autonomy and Diversity

Two conflicting (or at least divergent) bodies of public policy emanate
from Supreme Court consideration of equality versus association in cases
such as McCrary, Bob Jones, and Roberts and its successors. But shifting
to a context specific to the White World controversy, a third policy
emerges from the Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. 420 The
majority expressed high estimation of university autonomy as grounded in
the First Amendment, 421 unlike the Austrian Court’s subordination of that
autonomy to a statutory regimen.
Grutter gave universities broad discretion to further a compelling
interest in the educational benefits of maintaining student diversity––a mix
of students with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and
learn from each other.422 Just as geographical differences or particular
professional experiences can add to the mix, so too can the “unique
experience of being a racial minority in a society, like our own, in which
race unfortunately still matters.” 423 Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion
noted that not every race-influenced decision is equally problematic. Strict
scrutiny, which is not always “fatal in fact” when applied, provides a
framework for distinguishing between valid and invalid considerations of
race in the particular context at issue.424 The Court rejected a challenge to
Michigan Law School’s diversity policy brought by a White applicant who
alleged that she had been denied admission in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Law School gave favored treatment to minority
students with credentials similar to those of Whites who were not
accepted. 425
To insure discourse benefits, the school’s admissions policy utilized race
as a flexible and modest “plus” factor in order to include a “critical mass”
of minority students. 426 Stressing the importance of this goal, Grutter
approvingly quoted Justice Powell’s opinion in the landmark Regents of
University of California v. Bakke 427 case: “10 or 20 black students could
420. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
421. Id. at 332; see generally Paul Horwitz, Grutter’s First Amendment, SOC. SCI. RES.
NETWORK
ELECTRONIC
LIBR.,
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=568501.
422. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306.
423. Id. at 335.
424. Id. at 331.
425. Id. at 324-25.
426. Id. at 323-27, 337.
427. 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) discussed in the Grutter majority
opinion at 336. For an analysis of the evolution of Powell’s position to received wisdom,
see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, -- SUP. CT. REV. -- (SOC. SCI. RES. ELECTRONIC
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not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points
of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States.” 428
“Critical mass” indicated numbers that would encourage students to engage
in discussions inside and outside the classroom, without feeling isolated or
pressured to act as representatives of their race.429
Several prestigious constituencies filed amicus briefs bolstering (and
influencing) the majority’s compelling-state-interest conclusions.
Educational experts, major businesses, and military leaders urged that
student body diversity is essential to the development of professionalism,
international business skills, and an officer corps equipped to preserve the
fabric of society. 430 Cross-racial understanding––reducing misinformation
about the Other––produces an informed citizenry and prepares all students
for participation in a multi-cultural country and a global marketplace.
At the University of Vienna in the 1930’s, there was little dialogue
between Gentile and Jewish students. Adherents of the German Student
Body––the vast majority of the whole––were deeply invested in the
hierarchy of ethnic origin, and the University endorsed their
assumptions. 431 The limited opportunity for students from varying
backgrounds to exchange ideas arose within one or two political clubs that
mirrored the national political parties.432 Members of the German Student
Body graduated to become government and business officials who regarded
their Aryan heritage as a badge of entitlement.433 This, in turn, affected
Austria’s political institutions; democracy requires leaders who have an
accurate basis for assessing different viewpoints.
American universities today are complex institutions that pursue a
variety of goals. 434 One of these may be facilitating the upward mobility of
those who are blocked by the interrelated factors of discrimination and a
starting-point in poverty. These factors also hinder members of groups
NETWORK ELECTRONIC LIBR., Working Paper No. 03-12), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=476061.
428. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323.
429. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325-26.
430. Id. at 332-33.
431. See supra Part I.E.1.
432. See, e.g., PAULEY, supra note 2, at 122, 124.
433. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
434. Some of these are described by Christopher Kutz in Groups, Equality, and the
Promise of Democratic Politics, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE
OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, at 12-13 (2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art13
(last visited Nov. 1, 2004). Professor Kutz concludes that selective Universities are not
mere prizes for high test-takers, and that their purposes may include “transforming a racial
status hierarchy that arose under a white supremacy system” and “preparing a cadre of
professionals who are likely to serve underserved communities.” Id.
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who are subject to widespread vilification from effective participation in
the political process. 435 Professor Daniel Sabbagh suggests that university
training which raises the historically-shaped position of African-Americans
in the economic hierarchy can reduce “the correlation between race and
occupational status.” 436 This, in turn, would reduce the “functionality”––
the predictive value––of stereotypes.
In the White World example, the club’s primary purpose is to preserve
such stereotypes and prevent Blacks from escaping an ascribed status. But,
the University’s denial of the club’s request for conference space could
have no effect on the members’ self-identification and exclusivity as
established in their by-laws. Nor is the University’s decision aimed at
suppressing speech. White World can convene elsewhere and has a web
site (with many links to other organizations) through which it also
expresses its ideology. Rather, the University’s concern is with the harmful
effects on diversity which the club’s presence on campus could generate.
White World’s open conferences would bring to the campus a large
number of young people who are interested in taking action to confine
African-Americans to positions that accord with their “innate inferiority.”
Walking across campus grounds to reach the building where the conference
rooms are located, encounters with Black students would occur. Members
of White supremacist organizations have engaged in violence designed to
terrorize African-Americans at college campuses. 437 Although White
World acknowledges that its adherents have on some occasions engaged in

435. Id. at 12; see also the famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) questioning (as to the impact of legislation) “whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.”
436. See Daniel Sabbagh, Affirmative Action and the Group-Disadvantaging Principle, in
ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, at
5 (2003), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art14 (last visited Nov. 1, 2004); see also Cass
Sustein, Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2416 (1994) (discussing the
persistence of racial inequality even in free markets, and noting that attending a prestigious
college increases employment opportunities).
437. See Sylvia Castro, Suspect Arrested in Attack at SSUF; Clovis Man, 20, Faces
Attempted Murder and Hate Crime Charges, FRESNO BEE (California), Sept. 3, 1997, at A1;
Michael Kikorian & Kimi Yoshino, Man Arrested in Clovis Hate Crime; Brian Ritter Was
Linked to Similar Crime at Fresno State, FRESNO BEE (California), Dec. 23, 1998, at B1; see
also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, Hate Crimes On Campus: The Problem and Efforts to Confront It, Hate
Crimes Series no. 3, at 4, available at http://wwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/187249.pdf
(describing the detonation of a pipe bomb in the dorm room of two African-American
students on a Utah Campus, with the letters KKK painted in red nail polish on the bomb’s
firing device).
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fist-fights with Blacks as reported in the press, the club argues that its own
rhetoric skirts the Brandenburg v. Ohio prohibition against incitement to
immediate action. 438 The University is nonetheless hesitant to bear the risk
that illegal conduct including “fighting words” and assaults would
accompany the influx of outside attendees attracted to the conferences,
because such acts have a long-term impact.
Fighting words can have political aspects, but the Supreme Court has
barred such words from the speech marketplace because they “are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value
as a step to truth.” 439 Nor is an ideologically motivated assault “by any
stretch of the imagination expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment.” 440 As Professor Laurence L. Tribe notes, “expression has
special value only in the context of ‘dialogue’” between differing views,
not in the context of insults that do not present ideas but instead inflict
injury “by their very utterance.” 441
Systematic studies of ethnoviolence on college campuses were
conducted in the 1986-1995 period by the National Institute against
Prejudice and Violence and other researchers.442 Ethnoviolence has been
defined as acts “intended to cause physical or psychological harm to
persons because of their actual or perceived membership in a group.” 443 It
ranges from assaults, arson, and intimidation to vandalism and harassment.
Almost 25% of minority students had been victims of such conduct.444
Students sampled at a Maryland college and at nine colleges and
universities in New York State were asked about the effect of
ethnoviolence on them. Thirty percent felt afraid of more trouble; 29%
tried to be less visible and not to be noticed; 26% became withdrawn; 42%
obsessed about the incident; 54% were angry; 19% lost people they thought
were friends. 445 Others who were aware that a person sharing their ethnic
438. See 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding “[C]onstitutional guarantees of free speech . . . do
not permit a State to . . . proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action”). Id. at 447. For a discussion of Brandenburg’s
sparse reasoning and implications, see Maria L. Marcus, Policing Speech on the Airwaves:
Granting Rights, Preventing Wrongs, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 447, 461-467 (1997).
439. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
440. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
441. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 837 (1998).
442. See Issues, supra note 379, at 3, 11.
443. Id. at 2-3.
444. Id. at 6.
445. Id. at 11. A detailed executive summary of the underlying data states that compared
to other student groups that experience trauma, “there was a definite tendency for Black
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identity had been victims were also affected, even though they had not
personally been targets. 446 Access to the full university experience and the
equal opportunity to learn are truncated. If African-American students
withdraw from interactions with Whites inside and outside the classroom,
the benefits of diversity that were approved in Grutter would be dissipated.
A critical mass of numbers alone cannot be the objective. (Note the
scornful reference in Justice Thomas’ Grutter dissent to a mere “aesthetic”
interest in the color of students in the classrooms.) 447 The educational
value of diversity flows from discussion of insights and experiences.
To counteract these effects, would it be sufficient for the University
Dean in our example to join a grass-roots student protest against White
supremacy rather than keeping White World’s conferences out?448 A
University is a community embracing “expansive freedoms of speech and
thought,” and encouraging the “robust exchange of ideas.” 449 Yet the
exchange of ideas on an ongoing day-to-day basis is precisely what is being
suppressed by ethnoviolence. The occurrence of vituperation and threats
based solely on the highly visible (but morally irrelevant) element of
race 450 silences its targets and erodes their sense of security, even if other
groups of students or administrative officials are supportive.
The power of the neutrality principle, which would dictate that the
University cannot predicate its decisions on such consequences, must now
be reexamined. Considered in the abstract, an open speech marketplace
without content-based regulation of groups is desirable because it could
invigorate a search for permanent values and enhance democratic
governance. The Supreme Court, however, has recently taken a more
empirical tack. As indicated in Virginia v. Black’s 451 analysis of a statute
prohibiting cross-burning with the intent to intimidate, the government is
not limited to laws of general applicability when it provides legislative

students to experience more symptoms.” See Intergroup Relations On Campus––CUMBC:
The Second Study, Chapter Four, Traumatic Effects of Ethnoviolence and Sexual
Harrassment, at 7.
446. See Issues, supra note 379, at 7.
447. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 n.3 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
448. In view of the public policy at federal and state levels that condemns racial
discrimination, public officals may speak in vigorous opposition to racist ideology. Accord
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, 229, 231-32, discussed
in Abner S. Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667,
1684 and passim (2001). Professor Greene analyzes the conditions under which
government participation even in contested debates might be permissible. Id.; see also
Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2-6, 10 and passim (2000).
449. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324, 329.
450. See Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, supra note 386, at 2429.
451. 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
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protection for historically disadvantaged groups such as AfricanAmericans. Although Virginia had promulgated another more faciallyneutral law (burning an object with intent to intimidate) which would also
have covered a crossburning, 452 the Black majority interpreted the First
Amendment as permitting the state to single out the fiery cross as “a
particularly virulent form of intimidation.” 453 Justice O’Connor’s opinion
identified this symbol as a Ku Klux Klan method used to communicate
threats that assisted in maintaining White supremacy. 454
Black’s emphasis on history (“Virginia may choose to regulate this
subset of intimidating messages in light of cross-burning’s long and
pernicious history as a signal of impending violence”) 455 also has
implications for equal protection interpretation. Professor Sunstein
suggests that the Equal Protection Clause was “originally conceived as an
effort to counteract the disproportionate subjection of black people to
public and private violence.” 456 The University’s refusal to accommodate
White World’s conferences is not an effort to shield the government from
criticism; rather it is an effort to shield its Black students from
disproportionate exposure to intimidation and attack. Can the school
invoke both a Fourteenth and First Amendment basis for doing so?
Before Grutter, University counsel addressing this question had a
cramped range of arguments. Caselaw in other contexts proclaims that
anti-discrimination “policy” is established, while civil rights statutes
provide exceptions that would protect racist clubs.
The school’s
characterization of its forum as designed for “desirable public purposes”––
the Bob Jones formulation 457––appeared to beg the question of whether
barring biased activities was more desirable than fostering private
associations.
Grutter grounded university autonomy on the First Amendment, and
deferred to the school’s expert judgment (substantiated by the amici), that
diversity was essential to its academic goals. This compelling interest in
the educational benefits of maintaining a “critical mass” of minority
students could tilt the balance against White World’s associational claims.
The conference-space forum limitation to desirable purposes meshes well
452. Id. at 352 n.1.
453. Id. at 363.
454. Id. at 354 (quoting with approval W. WADE, THE FIERY CROSS: THE KU KLUX KLAN
IN AMERICA 147-48 (1998)).
455. Id. at 363.
456. See Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 821 (1993).
457. See supra notes 402, 407 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court concluded
that purveying racial bias neither served a desirable public purpose nor conferred a public
benefit.
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with precluding organizations that would undermine the University’s
diversity mission.
To arrive at a resolution of such a controversy under American law
requires intricate analysis of competing bodies of policy and of Supreme
Court decisions arising in a variety of settings. Austrian law in the 1930s
utilized a far more efficient system, in which all associations were
circumscribed by statute and subject to official supervision. Racist groups
fostered by a university could be shut down, although they could
potentially be reactivated by political changes in the legislative or
executive branches. America’s more cumbersome approach rejects this
hands-on control. Yet by forcing competing associational and equality
rights into an evolving constitutional framework, we give ourselves a better
chance of enduring.
CONCLUSION
The institution of slavery, which has decisively influenced America’s
history and its Constitution, embraced myths about race which still linger
despite judicial and legislative initiatives. Before Brown, unequal
treatment was rationalized and bureaucratized. Brown articulated the
baseline principles that eventually destroyed Jim Crow but new raciallyfueled challenges continue to emerge, most recently in the arena of higher
education. This Article suggests that an understanding of these challenges
may be gained by viewing them both from an American and from a global
perspective.
Universities have guarded their autonomy and discretion to decide who
to admit, what to teach, and how to teach it. Such autonomy engenders a
responsibility to the student body as a whole and creates a safe space for a
spirit of inquiry, but poses a risk that racism might find shelter in the
institution’s independence from judicial intervention. Two cases discussed
in this Article suggest that risk, and show how it may be obviated. Each
university invoked separate-but-equal treatment and associational freedom
to achieve a pre-set segregation goal, but each was eventually thwarted by
the judiciary’s associations analysis.
The University of Vienna argued that segregation of its Jewish and
Christian students into different “Nations” was merely an internal matter,
and that members of each group benefited from affiliating with those of the
same “ethnic origin.” The University’s autonomy, however, provided no
shield against the Associations Law, which allowed a high degree of
government control over citizen groups. This regulatory power enabled the
Austrian Constitutional Court to halt the student divisions, but was also
available for use by the executive branch to further its own political
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agenda.
The University of Oklahoma asserted that its admission of G.W.
McLaurin, an African-American student who was allowed to attend classes
and study in a separate assigned place and eat at an assigned table alone,
was sufficient to fulfill all its educational responsibilities and its obligations
under state law. The Supreme Court introduced a pivotal associations
concept into its equal treatment discussion: that McLaurin’s education
would be undermined by his government-mandated inability to have
discussions and to commingle intellectually with his classmates. This
approach transformed the associations doctrine, emphasizing inclusion
rather than exclusion.
In America and in Austria, the judiciary was uncomfortable with the role
of dismantling segregation. Both courts were confronted with implacable
opposition to the idea of integration, and devoted considerable thought to
crafting a decision that would somehow soothe the sensibilities and
tempers of these opponents. Ultimately, the Justices in each case were
constrained to accept the initial consequences of their choice: student riots
and further public attempts to resegregate.
The Brown decision is now celebrating its fiftieth anniversary. It has
opened college, university, and graduate school doors to AfricanAmericans in far greater numbers than before, discounting the argument
that Whites were permitted to wall themselves off by law from contact with
Blacks. Under Brown’s unanimous directive, the Fourteenth Amendment
secured equality by incorporating the McLaurin associational rights of
African-American students. Most recently, Grutter v. Bollinger accorded
broad discretion to Michigan Law School to further a compelling interest in
the educational benefits of increasing student diversity and cross-racial
understanding. Here it was the University’s First Amendment associational
right to assemble this varied student body that took precedence over a
White applicant’s Fourteenth Amendment claims.
While the American politics of race has its own unique features, the
practice of segregating groups of people and forcing them into hierarchies
dictated by the social conditions and ruling ideology of the day has
tenacious roots throughout the world. The rule of law as expressed in a
constitution may clash sharply with the court of public opinion and political
power. The rationalization of hereditary and fixed ranking based on tainted
blood was enforced by streams of legislation that led to the Holocaust in
Austria and to prolonged subservience to majority rule-makers in the
American South. The Supreme Court’s succinct (albeit imperfect) “hard
look” at Plessy penetrated supposedly neutral mandates and made
segregation here an outlaw both legally and morally. Brown was decided
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less than ten years post-Holocaust––not a coincidence.

